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Executive Summary  
Food and power in Somali have been intimately 
linked for decades. Ranging from land grabs 
and the manipulation of food aid to looting and 
diversion of aid – and entangled in the 
geopolitics of the so-called War on Terror – 
food has played a role in Somalia’s political 
economy. The political economy of food has 
been examined for the 1990s, but less so for the 
famines of the 2000s. This study examines how 
the political economy of food has changed in 
the past 10 to 15 years, with shifts in 
governance and in aid. Changes in governance 
include the establishment of Al-Shabaab 
(following the rise and fall of the Islamic Courts 
Union) as Somalia’s principal Islamic extremist 
group, which controlled most of south-central 
Somalia from 2006. From 2012, Somalia has 
had an internationally recognised federal 
government, following previous attempts at 
installing governments in 2000 and 2004. 
Changes in aid include the shift from food aid to 
cash transfers and a focus on nutrition during 
periods when people suffered famine and 
humanitarian crisis in 2008, 2011, and 2017. 
The study combines the concept of political 
economy with that of the political market place 
(a political system characterized by the 
dominance of transactional politics over 
institutions, in which political office, loyalty, and 
services are tradable commodities) (De Waal, 
2015) and with regimes of aid practices (sets of 
linked practices, including the techniques, 
science, organisations, authorities, and 
businesses involved) and their effects (Jaspars, 
2018). The research team interviewed long-
term aid workers, businessmen and women, 
government officials, and displaced people in 
May and June 2019 in Nairobi, Mogadishu, and 
Baidoa. 
Key findings are that while power gained 
through controlling food aid or assistance has 
been dispersed, much remains concentrated 
within a limited political and business elite. 
From the mid-1990s to 2010, food aid was one 
of Somalia’s biggest businesses because of the 
scope for collusion between transporters, the 
World Food Programme (WFP), and 
implementing partners to win contracts and 
divert food. The shift from food aid to cash 
transfers – in particular in the last decade – has 
led to the involvement of many new and smaller 
traders, but they remain dependent on a limited 
number of large businesses for supply. Much of 
the new power is with local authorities and Non-
Governmental Organisation (NGO) staff. The 
earlier food aid contractors remain among the 
wealthiest and most politically influential people 
in Somalia, involved in anything from fuel supply 
to construction to trade. Money-transfer 
companies are among the most powerful in 
Somalia, in part because of their involvement in 
aid-related cash transfers, and – like other large 
businesses – are involved in anything that is 
profitable. This includes real estate, 
construction, food imports, commercial cash-
crop production, and more. These large 
businesses require a cheap, flexible, and 
exploitable labour force, which can be found 
among the displaced. 
A shift to cash-crop production in rural areas 
has further concentrated power within the same 
trading or money-transfer companies. It has 
also further increased the vulnerability of 
already marginalised populations, many of 
whom have been forced to sell their land and are 
displaced. Most of the productive areas in 
southern Somalia are under Al-Shabaab control, 
including the rural areas of Bay and Bakool and 
along the Juba and Shebelle rivers, which is also 
where many of the most marginalised 
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populations live. While Al-Shabaab originally 
supported these groups in disputes over land, 
they have not protected them from – and may 
even have created – the increasingly harsh and 
coercive living conditions in the areas they 
control. From 2012, the government captured 
towns and effectively created a series of city 
states in south-central Somalia, where aid and 
the displaced are now concentrated. As such, 
Al-Shabaab may indirectly re-enforce the 
business-aid connection by forcing 
displacement and the need for aid. 
These changes in food and power have also led 
to changes in the intersection between the 
commodification of aid and the 
commodification of politics. The large food-aid 
contractors of the 1990s and early 2000s used 
their wealth to buy political status and influence. 
With cash transfers, the marketplace for buying 
political loyalty has become more dispersed, 
with district authorities gaining in power 
through aid distribution. For money-transfer 
agencies, the key strategy is to ensure political 
compliance and protection so that their 
business can continue to expand. Al-Shabaab 
enters the political marketplace indirectly by 
enabling commercial cash crop production and 
the continuation of aid and by taxing food 
imports, internal transport, and trade. The 
importance of populations in Al-Shabaab-held 
areas for money-transfer organisations, means 
Al-Shabaab can influence government ability to 
regulate indirectly through these organisations. 
Government is by far the weaker partner in any 
negotiations involving business with the 
international community. 
Few of these changes in power and vulnerability 
are reflected by regimes of food aid practices, 
whether in food security, nutrition, assessment 
targeting, or distribution. Current cash and 
nutrition practices focus on individual 
responsibility and behaviour rather than the 
structural causes of malnutrition and food 
insecurity. Somalia’s political and funding 
environment requires that aid organisations and 
the government perform both frontstage and 
backstage functions in the humanitarian theatre 
(Desportes et al., 2019). Frontstage, aid is 
improving because of new practices and aims: 
cash transfers, quantitative indicators, digital 
systems, third party monitoring, and an overall 
aim of resilience. Also frontstage, government 
is developing policies along the same lines. 
Backstage, politics and power are prominent 
and aid diversion and the marginalisation and 
exploitation of particular population groups 
continue. For members of the government, 
aligning with donor priorities attracts the 
resources necessary for maintaining a political 
budget and therefore the loyalty of their clan. 
Aid organisations, business, and government – 
and possibly Al-Shabaab – all benefit from the 
status quo of continued aid flows into 
government-held urban areas. However, it also 
requires maintaining a large displaced 
population and, by extension, the continued 
marginalisation and exploitation of certain 
population groups. The displaced have become 
not only a way of maintaining aid but also a 
business opportunity and a political tool. 
Gatekeepers or entrepreneurs set up displaced 
camps as a way of attracting aid and increasing 
the value of land. Politically, the concentration 
of aid in government-held towns facilitates 
counter-insurgency operations as it maintains 
the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) 
or Somali National Army (SNA) presence there. 
This does not address the causes of 
malnutrition and food insecurity. 
The political and economic effects of aid raise 
wider issues for humanitarian actors. How have 
issues of aid diversion, and exclusion or 
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marginalisation, continued for so long? Is there 
a degree of acceptance of a permanent state of 
crisis or precarity among the displaced? How 
complicit are international aid actors in the 
creation of cheap and exploitable labour for 
business and a new plantation economy? These 
are large questions to be addressed, and are 
part of global trends in the growth of precarity, 
the digitisation of welfare, and making poverty 
and conflict less visible (Duffield, 2019b). More 
immediate actions are limited until the political 
causes of Somalia’s ongoing crisis and 
instability are addressed. The report gives 
recommendations for exploring whether 
business actions are illegal or immoral and 
raises the importance of civic values of 
solidarity and protection. It also highlights the 
need for aid practices to be explicit about the 
impact of politics and conflict and for donors to 
encourage this. 
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1. Introduction 
Food is central to power in Somalia. It has played a 
key role in how Somalia is governed and in who 
suffers and who benefits from famine and relief. 
Food has influenced power relations through land 
grabs and the manipulation of food aid as part of a 
system of political patronage in the 1970s and 
1980s, and through looting, displacement and 
diversion of aid by warlords in the 1990s. In the 
2000s, Al-Shabaab banned US food aid and large-
scale diversion of humanitarian relief has 
continued to be reported in government areas. 
Production, trade, and food assistance have 
historically been controlled by a few powerful 
individuals or businesses, with benefits often 
allocated according to clan affiliation. Other 
groups have been marginalized, discriminated 
against, and exploited, in particular the agro-
pastoral populations in the Bay and Bakool regions 
and the riverine farmers along the Juba and 
Shebelle rivers. These groups have shown 
persistently high levels of acute malnutrition and 
suffered the most severe famines, including in 
1992 and 2011. 
The wider political economy of food, and in 
particular food assistance, has been much 
examined for the 1990s, but less so for the food 
crises and famines of the 2000s. At the same time, 
the 2000s coincide with changes in aid practices 
and governance for Somalia. Changes in aid 
practices include new forms of food assistance 
such as cash transfers (vouchers, cash 
distributions, and mobile transfers) and 
specialised nutrition products, also considered to 
be food-based resilience approaches. Changes in 
governance include the rise of the Union of Islamic 
Courts in 2005. The group Al-Shabaab, initially a 
militia under the Courts’ control, became the 
principal Islamic extremist group after the defeat 
of the Courts in December 2006, controlling most 
of south-central Somalia thereafter. Aid delivery to 
these areas dropped dramatically after the US 
designated the group a terrorist organisation in 
2008. Al-Shabaab itself banned US food aid from 
February 2010, which escalated in response to the 
2011 famine. In 2019, when fieldwork for this study 
was undertaken, rural areas were still largely 
controlled by Al-Shabaab but towns were 
(nominally) held by the Somali government. The 
other key change in governance was the 
establishment of Somalia’s internationally 
recognised federal government (the Federal 
Government of Somalia or FGS), following 
previous attempts in 2000 and 2004, which came 
into effect in 2012. 
This report argues that even while food assistance 
practices and governance have changed in the 
past fifteen years, much of Somalia’s recent 
political economy of food is a story of continuities. 
Food and power remain in the hands of an 
oligopoly of businessmen, who are able to 
influence national and local politics and whose 
enterprises depend on the exploitation of others. 
Cash transfers involve more traders and retailers 
at the local level than food aid delivery did 
previously but they still depend on a few large 
traders to supply food. Mobile cash transfers as 
aid have contributed to the growth of a limited 
number of telecoms and money-transfer 
companies. Both former food-aid transporters and 
money-transfer agents are involved in a range of 
other business ventures and in various forms of 
political patronage and influence. Marginalisation 
of certain groups remains and their displacement 
has increased. This is both because exploitative 
conditions for riverine farmers (in particular in 
relation to the commercial production of cash 
crops) have increased their sale of land and 
because aid is largely distributed in large urban 
areas. Once displaced, they become a business 
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opportunity and a source of aid for landowners and 
“entrepreneurs”. 
Following a short section on concepts, objectives, 
and methods, the report reviews the history of food 
and power in Somalia, as this sets the stage for the 
current political and economic processes that 
determine why some people have access to food 
and others don’t. The third section examines the 
diffusion of power following a shift in logistics, 
including the investment in new ventures by big 
food-aid contractors, the large number of new 
smaller actors, and the new power of the money-
transfer companies. Section 4 analyses changes in 
production and trade, including the link between 
displacement, sale of land, and shift to cash-crop 
production, much of which is also driven by food 
aid or cash transfer companies. This is followed by 
an analysis of changes in food assistance 
practices more broadly and how they have made 
politics and political economy invisible. Section 6 
discusses the limited role of the Federal 
Government of Somalia but the increased power of 
local authorities because of the concentration of 
aid in government-held towns. Finally, the last 
section examines the role of the displaced within 
Somalia’s political economy, as even the displaced 
have become a business opportunity. 
Overview of concepts, objectives, and 
methods 
The study explores the key changes in the political 
economy of food since the mid-2000s, focusing on 
production, trade, and food assistance. In addition 
to changes in aid practices and in governance, this 
period includes three instances of severe crisis or 
famine – 2008, 2011 and 2017 – and large 
humanitarian operations in response. The focus is 
on South West State, Jubaland, and Benadir as 
these are the areas where famines and food 
insecurity have been most severe and where 
humanitarian operations have been most 
contentious in the past. These areas are also most 
affected by Al-Shabaab’s presence. 
The study combines the concepts of political 
economy, the political marketplace, and regimes of 
aid practices. Building on the work of Duffield 
(1994) and Keen (1994), the political economy of 
famine and relief can be seen as the maintenance 
of power by asset-stripping of politically weak 
populations. This can be done by force, through 
manipulation of markets, or by state appropriation. 
Aid is part of, or feeds into, this. Keen’s work on the 
benefits of famine furthermore shows how the 
exploitation or exclusion of particular groups (to 
the point of famine) has important benefits for 
some. Collinson (2003) defined political economy 
as vulnerability. He analysed power as a political 
and economic process in terms – for instance, of 
neglect, exclusion, or exploitation – in which a 
variety of groups and actors play a part. Within 
such a framework, group identity or political 
position may expose people to violence. This 
interpretation of political economy is 
complemented with the concept of the political 
marketplace. The political marketplace is a system 
of governance where transactions or deals to buy 
political loyalty dominate institutions, laws, and 
regulations. In other words a system of 
governance in which political loyalty is bought or 
sold (De Waal, 2015). While we use political 
economy to examine how the interaction of 
political and economic processes leads to power 
and vulnerability in terms of control over resources, 
the political marketplace examines how food – 
whether as production or aid – has become a 
means of buying political loyalty, political power, or 
political compliance. In other words, this study also 
examines the intersection between the 
commodification of food assistance and the 
commodification of politics. 
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Food aid is more than a gift or a commodity, it is 
also a technology of governance and a regime of 
practices. Food aid is a technology of governance 
because it has the power to change behaviour or 
power relations or manage populations (Jaspars, 
2018: 11). Food aid as a way of governing ranges 
from the disciplinary measures of food for work to 
the promotion of resilience (whether by reducing 
food aid or linking it to behaviour change) or 
through monitoring, surveillance, and the 
development of norms – ie, the level of risk 
considered acceptable (also termed biopolitics; 
see Foucault, 2007). This study analyses the effect 
of food aid using the concept of “regimes of 
practices”. Originally developed by Foucault (ibid.), 
the concept was elaborated by Schaffer (1984), as 
a means of analysing policy through examining the 
knowledge it takes for granted and how selected 
problems emerge from existing theories, 
institutions, apparatuses. In analysing regimes of 
food aid practices1 in this study, we examine food 
aid and nutrition practices (eg, objectives, 
assessment, targeting), the science that informs 
these practices and the knowledge it creates, the 
objects of practice (eg, Internally Displaced 
Persons (IDP), vulnerable groups), the donors and 
international organisations involved, as well as the 
government, aid organisations, and businesses at 
the national and local levels. We analyse the actual 
power effects of this combination of practices and 
the actors involved and how this has changed over 
time. A review of the literature on food (including 
food aid) and power is provided in Section 2. 
Using these three concepts, we arrived at the main 
objectives of the scoping study: 
1. To examine how the political economy of food 
in Somalia has changed in the past 10 to 15 
years, with a particular focus on changes in 
food assistance and in governance. 
2. To explore whether and how the political 
marketplace applies to food; ie, how is food or 
are food practices used to buy political loyalty 
or suppress opposition, and how has this 
changed over time. 
3. To analyse changes in regimes of food 
assistance practices and their political and 
economic effects (with particular emphasis on 
the change from food aid to cash and 
resilience practices, and on the famine or crisis 
years of 2008, 2011, and 2017). 
Detailed research questions are shown in Annex 1. 
The study mainly used qualitative methods 
consisting of semi-structured interviews with a 
range of key informants, including long-term aid 
workers, businesspeople (traders, transporters, 
importer/exporters, money-transfer agents), 
government officials, and IDP representatives. In 
all cases, we purposively selected informants with 
long-term experience so they could talk 
knowledgeably about change. The research was 
approved by the Ministry of Planning. A total of 71 
interviews took place in Nairobi, Baidoa, and 
Mogadishu as shown in Table 1. 
 
Table 1: Interview sample 
Place Aid worker Trader/transporter Money-transfer agent Government official IDP representative 
Nairobi 31 2 2 0 0 
Mogadishu 6 6  6 5 
Baidoa 2 4 1 3 3 
                                                   
1 For more information on regimes of food aid practices, see 
Jaspars, 2018.  
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The interviews were done in two stages. The first 
was from 28 April to 5 May 2019, with long-term 
aid workers in Nairobi. Many of these had been 
involved in aid since the 1990s, and some even 
earlier. The findings of these interviews were used 
to refine the questions and checklists for the 
second stage of fieldwork, which included 
interviews with aid workers, government officials, 
traders and transporters, and IDPs. Fieldwork in 
Somalia took place from 21 June to 4 July 2019. 
Half of those interviewed in the first stage of field 
work were Somali, as were all those interviewed in 
the second stage. Doing any research in or on 
Somalia presents challenges, due to issues of 
access, security, and trust. It is only possible to set 
up interviews using established relationships of 
trust, especially to ensure information is reliable. 
The first stage of purposive sampling was 
therefore the selection of key informants that each 
of us knew from previous engagement in Somalia, 
and they in turn suggested others. IDP 
representatives were purposively selected from 
Hanano 2 and Dowty Malabley in Baidoa and from 
Saidka IDP Camp, Jidka Sodonka and Jama’ada 
Lafoole in Mogadishu. In Somalia, Susanne 
Jaspars had to ask key informants to visit her in a 
secure hotel, but Guhad Adan was able to travel to 
meet key informants where they lived or worked. 
In addition to interviews, a literature review was 
undertaken of both key published and grey 
literature concerning the politics and governance 
of production, trade, and food aid before and 
during the conflict. More than100 documents were 
reviewed. 
                                                   
2 Although Siad Barre’s government was not overthrown until 
1991, there was already widespread violent land grabbing in 
1988 and armed insurrection by the Somali National Movement 
(SNM) in northern Somalia in the 1980s and from 1989 in the 
2. Background – history of food and 
power in Somalia 
While the focus of this study is the past 10 to 15 
years, the key areas for exploration are influenced 
by earlier trends. From a brief review of literature 
(see below), it is possible to identify three broad 
periods in the political economy of food, in 
particular when considering trends in vulnerability 
and power in production, trade, and aid. The first 
period is during Siad Barre’s government, when 
wealth and power were already concentrated in a 
minority elite and depended in part on the 
marginalisation of particular groups (ie, the riverine 
groups and the Rahanweyn in Bay and Bakool). 
The second period is the first decade of the conflict 
(from 1989 to 1999)2 when clan-based militias 
fought for control over resources, including large-
scale looting and theft, displacement and famine 
among those who had earlier been marginalised. In 
contrast, business and trade blossomed in 
livestock, charcoal, electronic goods, money 
transfer. During the third period, from 2000, various 
forms of Western- and Ethiopian-backed 
governments were introduced, with a coincident 
rise of Islamist movements, leading to a 
resumption of conflict, large-scale displacements, 
and famine or humanitarian crises in 2008, 2011, 
and 2017. Throughout these three periods, aid – in 
particular food aid –fed into and re-enforced these 
power relations. It supported governments, 
warlords, and businesses, but the nature of how it 
did this changed over time. This section first briefly 
describes the political economy of food for each of 
the earlier periods, followed by a description of key 
aspects of the period from 2005, to form the basis 
of the remainder of this report. 
south, with the Somalia Patriotic Movement (SPM) and Somalia 
Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF) active in the area from mid-
1990. 
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Before the conflict – Siad Barre’s regime 
Somalia’s economy during Siad Barre’s regime has 
been described as a rentier economy (Samatar, 
2008) or rentier kleptocracy (De Waal, 2015) in 
which the state buys political loyalties or grants 
favoured rent-seekers with opportunities, including 
aid, civil society positions, or state assets. 
Legitimate enterprise was frustrated with much of 
trade and business becoming part of an informal 
economy (Mubarak, 1997). Political power was 
concentrated within a clique of leaders associated 
with three Daarod clans, nicknamed MOD for 
Marehan (President Siad Barre’s own clan, the 
most powerful), Ogaden, and Dulbahante, which 
benefited most from a political system based on 
patronage. During the early socialist years of the 
1970s, this group benefited from state farms and 
price controls and did so again with the 
capitalisation of agriculture (and structural 
adjustment) in the 1980s, when the liberalisation of 
land tenure facilitated land grabs by the well-
connected (Samatar, 2008). 
Key components of the economy were livestock, 
farming (subsistence and cash crops), 
remittances, and aid. Cash crops consisted mainly 
of banana for export along the Juba and Shebelle 
rivers. From the late 1970s labour and land in this 
production system were highly commodified and 
dependent on cheap and exploitable labour, mostly 
from the clans that inhabited the fertile land along 
and between the rivers and that were not well-
represented politically. Land grabs started with the 
Italian colonisers, and they were followed by 
politicians, civil servants, and merchants who 
could register the land. In terms of trade, only the 
largest merchants profited from livestock and 
cash-crop exports as only a few businesses were 
granted export licenses (Ahmad, 2012). Much of 
                                                   
3 This was food aid provided through US Public Law 480 Title 1. 
Programme food aid is direct government-to-government aid, 
Somalia, however, consisted of a rural production 
system that operated independently of 
government, together with an urban sector 
dependent on remittances. Migration to the Middle 
East grew throughout the 1970s and 1980s as a 
result of the oil boom and economic opportunities 
(Lindley, 2009). 
Aid was (and remains) a key component of 
Somalia’s economy, accounting for as much as 57 
per cent of Somalia’s Gross National Product 
(GNP) in 1987 (Menkhaus, 2014: 156). Food aid to 
Somalia has increased dramatically since the 
1970s, in response to drought in 1974, and in much 
larger quantities following the influx of refugees 
following the Ogaden war with Ethiopia (of 1978). 
Prior to this, food aid was used to resettle nomads 
and programme food aid was sold on the market3 
(Thomson, 1983: 212). This aid sustained Siad 
Barre’s government, which used it (or the 
associated aid contracts) to reward Barre’s 
supporters. Reportedly, 85 per cent of aid for 
refugees was diverted (Askin, 1987, referenced in 
De Waal, 1997). While this was arguably one of the 
worst instances of food diversion in history, within 
the context of the Cold War, Somalia was too 
valuable an ally from which to suspend aid. The 
Somali government played its weak hand well, 
threatening Western aid donors that should they 
withhold assistance, it was in danger of collapse 
(Lefebrve, 1992). 
The 1990s – conflict, warlords, and 
increase in business opportunities 
The 1970s and 1980s set the scene for what was 
to follow. Control of production, trade, and aid by 
powerful individuals or business, in part through 
the looting and exploitation of marginal groups, 
provided on concessional credit terms; it is a loan rather than a 
grant.  
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was taken to extremes after the fall of Siad Barre 
in 1991 and the start of Somalia’s long civil war. 
As opposition to his rule grew, Siad Barre was 
ousted by a coalition of rebels led by the United 
Somali Congress (USC) and the country 
descended into civil war. Between 1991 and 1993, 
conflict raged in the riverine and inter-riverine areas 
of Middle and Lower Shebelle, Lower Juba, and Bay 
regions. A war economy of large-scale and violent 
looting and resource capture developed, resulting 
in one of Somalia’s most severe famines in 1992. 
The riverine and inter-riverine populations were 
most vulnerable as they were largely unarmed (see 
Box 1). Many were displaced or forced off their 
lands. New “landowners” from within the Daarod, 
and later Hawiye, clan families, from Mogadishu, 
presented themselves as liberators in Lower 
Shebelle. Along the Juba river, both Marehan and 
Ogaden (dominant groups) claimed Rahanweyn, 
Gabaweyn, or Bantu land (De Waal, 2007). This 
created a new group of small holders and day 
labourers who were much more vulnerable to food 
insecurity, as well as ongoing conflict between 
“landowners” and “liberators” (African Rights, 
1993). Some of the highest rates of malnutrition 
were recorded in 1992, but rates remained high 
throughout the 1990s among these same 
vulnerable groups (Jaspars, 2000). 
 
 
Box 1: Marginalisation and minorities in Somalia 
Clan identity and dynamics in Somalia are complex and contested. Somali social hierarchy contains a 
number of groups, with the four noble or pastoralist clans at the top: Dir, Darod, Hawiye. Others have 
historically been marginalised politically and economically. They include the agro-pastoral Rahanweyn (also 
called Digil and Mirifle), and the originally indigenous Cushitic farming people such as the Shebelle and 
Gabaweyn, and the Bantu. The Bantu consist of a number of groups: some are descendants of original 
inhabitants of the area and others are descendants of slaves brought into the country in the nineteenth 
century (De Waal, 1997). The latter are not part of the clan system at all. Other marginalized groups include 
the minority Benadiri, Midgaan, Bajuni, Eyle, Tumal, Yibir, Galgaala, characterized by the stigma of their 
occupational status and grievances of “ritual uncleanliness” (Narbeth and McLean, 2003). For example, the 
Eyle were traditionally hunters, the Tumal blacksmiths, etc. There are also adopted clan members (sheegat) 
who have been incorporated into another group but may retain a different social and political status 
(Menkhaus, 2010). In the current 4.5 federal government system,4 the Gabaweyn are part of the Rahanweyn 
(now a main clan) while other minority groups including the Somali Bantu are part of others (the 0.5). 
Marginalised groups form a relatively large proportion of the population, particularly in southern Somalia, 
and have traditionally inhabited some of Somalia’s most fertile land. The minority Shebelle, Gabaweyn, and 
Bantu have been systematically dispossessed from their land along the Juba and Shebelle rivers, a process 
that started in the 1980s. The Rahanweyn have been politically marginalised but are not a minority. Within 
the Rahanweyn, however, there are power imbalances, with some wealthy and economically diverse sub-
clans and lineages and other much poorer ones. The Rahanweyn and Bantu (and other minorities) are often 
subject to discrimination and exploitation by more powerful groups when they have been displaced into other 
clan-based areas. The vulnerability of the riverine and inter-riverine populations to famine in 1991 and in 2011 
was a direct consequence of their political marginalization (De Waal, 1997). 
                                                   
4 The Somali political system is based on the “4.5” formula, 
which is constituted by the four biggest clans (Daarod, Dir – 
including Isaaq–, Hawiye and Rahanweyn) with the 0.5 
allocated to minority groups.   
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Business boomed as the absence of a state 
opened up new opportunities. Exports of 
livestock, bananas, and charcoal grew as did 
the import of consumer goods (Hagmann, 
2016). According to Samatar (2008), the 
stateless economy was an extreme version of 
neoliberal informality, characterised by the 
complete absence of public authority and 
security. He divides the economy into four 
parts: (1) warlord controlled (including former 
state assets: airports, seaports, plantations, 
and farmland), (2) business-lord controlled 
(import/export),5 (3) telecoms and money 
transfer, (4) small professional and retail 
enterprises, farming, and pastoralism. 
Hagmann and Stepputat (2016: 17) called the 
early 1990s an “economy of plunder”, 
consisting of violent asset-stripping and 
associated with the rise of protection rackets. 
With the arrival of the United Nations Operation 
in Somalia (UNOSOM) peace-keeping operation 
in 1992, and WFP, aid contracts became 
Somalia’s biggest business with the first two 
groups – warlords and business lords – playing 
a key role. Some of Somalia’s largest 
businesses today made their initial capital at 
this time (Ahmad, 2012; Hagmann, 2016). This 
was confirmed by the food-aid transporters we 
interviewed; they became involved in the early 
1990s, because food aid was the most lucrative 
and reliable business (key informants 28 and 
34, 2019). Warlords made money through 
diversion and protection rackets. Over time, this 
economy evolved with the business class 
gradually becoming more dominant than the 
                                                   
5 Samatar (2008) explains that warlords control the revenue 
from these state assets and use some to pay their militias. 
Business lords act in a parallel manner and import or export 
whatever they can sell. The latter operate inside and outside 
of the country and control most of the armed militias, which 
gives them an advantage over smaller entrepreneurs.  
6 According to the UN Monitoring Group (UN Security 
Council, 2012: 310), gatekeepers are individuals and 
warlords, and developing extensive but 
oligopolistic trade networks as accumulation 
took place (Hagmann and Stepputat, 2016). As 
this report will show, the oligopolistic features 
of the economy still apply today except food aid 
has been replaced by cash transfers and Al-
Shabaab or private security companies provide 
protection. 
With food aid being the main resource, its 
manipulation became extreme. The 
International Committee of the Red Cross and 
Crescent (ICRC) were the first to distribute food, 
and established thousands of soup kitchens 
because so much food was diverted from dry 
distributions (Jaspars, 2000). However, even 
with soup kitchens, elders registered “ghost 
kitchens” and “ghost villages” to attract more 
food (De Waal, 1997: 170). With the arrival of 
UNOSOM, faction leaders used funding from 
international sources to legitimate claims to 
power (Hammond and Vaughan-Lee, 2012). By 
the late 1990s, large-scale conflict subsided, as 
did aid – but its manipulation continued. 
Diversion to clan elders and exclusion of the 
most vulnerable remained issues, but the role 
of gatekeepers6 in taxing IDPs became a 
particular concern (see for example Narbeth 
and McLean, 2003). A private business class 
became the dominant political force, as trade 
continued to grow within the hands of a few 
businesspeople (Hagmann, 2006: 32). At the 
same time, financial systems evolved, with 
traditional hawala (money transfer system) 
being incorporated into larger enterprises and 
organisations who position themselves to harness 
humanitarian assistance flows for their own personal or 
political advantage. They exercise control over the location 
of IDP camps; the delivery, distribution and management of 
assistance; and even physical access to IDP camps and 
feeding centres.  
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because of new technologies (email, etc) 
(Lindley, 2009). The main companies at this 
time were Dahabshiil, Amal, and Al-Bakarat. The 
business class, with its financial muscle, 
became the main source of political patronage 
in the country, which included – initially – 
support for warlords. 
Changes in governance and food 
assistance since 2005 
From 2000, Somalia has had some form of 
internationally recognized government, 
although a sense that a central government 
might endure was not gained until the 
establishment of the Federal Government of 
Somalia in 2012. In 2000, a Transitional 
National Government (TNG), dominated by 
Hawiye clan elements, soon met with 
resistance. Warlords, backed by Ethiopia, 
fought the TNG and allied militias, causing 
large-scale displacement (Jaspars and 
Maxwell, 2008). From 2004, the Transitional 
Federal Government (TFG) took over, with 
Ethiopia’s backing, leading to a Hawiye-based 
Islamist movement in Mogadishu and the 
bringing together of clan-based Islamist courts 
by the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC). A joint 
Ethiopian/US offensive soon followed 
(December 2006), taking over the capital and 
other key towns within 4 or 5 weeks and 
resulting again in large-scale displacement. The 
situation of displaced people in the Afgoye 
corridor (close to Mogadishu) was considered 
the world’s worst humanitarian crisis in 2008 
(Maxwell and Majid, 2016). Ethiopian forces 
occupied much of southern Somalia at this 
time and were supported by US airstrikes. The 
Ethiopian forces handed over to the African 
Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) in early 
2007, which consisted almost entirely of troops 
from East African states with political interests 
in Somalia and ready to mount combat 
missions under an African Union (AU) banner. 
However, Ethiopia retained military control of its 
buffer zone in south-central Somalia and 
subsequently enrolled its force as a contingent 
of AMISOM. The Ethiopian occupation was 
associated with the rise of Al-Shabaab, an 
Islamist movement that initially attracted much 
support – particularly from the traditionally 
marginalised clans (Majid and McDowell, 
2012). Al-Shabaab soon covered much of 
southern Somalia, including much of 
Mogadishu, Bay and Bakool regions, and much 
of Middle and Lower Juba. It was designated a 
terrorist organisation by the US from 2008, and 
Al-Shabaab banned US food aid to the areas 
under its control from February 2010, including 
during the 2011 famine. This effectively halted 
the food aid operations of CARE and WFP, 
which had provided relief to much of southern 
Somalia. Mogadishu was retaken by AMISOM 
forces in 2011, and towns in Bay, Bakool, Lower 
and Middle Juba in 2014 and 2015. 
While cash-transfer programmes had been 
implemented on a small scale from 2003 (see 
Majid et al., 2007), and were considered 
successful, the ban on food aid along with 
limited access for Western NGOs to Al-Shabaab 
areas led to a massive (and necessary) scaling 
up of cash operations in response to the famine 
in 2011. Cash-based programmes have 
continued – and evolved further since this time 
and were again scaled up in response to the 
2017 crisis (and warnings of a potential famine) 
(Maxwell and Majid, 2016; Daniels and 
Anderson, 2018). This is further explored in 
Section 3. It started with cash transfers using 
hawala such as Dahabshiil, whether as part of 
cash for work or direct grants. By 2019, the two 
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dominant means of cash transfer were WFP’s 
food vouchers (using an electronic card or 
SCOPE system that used a large network of 
retailers in towns in south-central Somalia, now 
South West and Jubaland regions), and mobile 
transfers (mainly using Hormuud telecoms 
company) (see Box 2 on the evolution of cash 
transfer programmes). The actual form of aid, 
and the entire regime of practices and the 
political economy around it, changed. As the 
following sections will show, new traders and 
transporters supply smaller amounts of food to 
WFP retailers, previous food aid contractor 
entered into new business, and “mobile money” 
led to the rise of telecoms companies. In 
addition to the logistics of aid (procurement 
and transport), assessment and distribution 
methodologies changed, as did interactions 
with government, all underpinned by an 
ideology of resilience (see Section 4). The 
extent and patterns of displacement changed 
between 2011 and 2017 because by 2017, 
towns were held by government. As will be seen 
in the following sections, Al-Shabaab’s actions 
changed and so did aid modalities and the way 
aid could be manipulated. Patterns of 
production and trade changed simultaneously. 
Some as a result of changing patterns of 
displacement, others because of new 
investment or aid opportunities. The next two 
sections of this report explore the wider political 
and economic effects of the shift from food aid 
to cash transfers and of changes in production. 
 
 
Box 2: Evolution of cash transfers as humanitarian assistance in Somalia 
Aid organisations in Somalia have been at the forefront of pioneering cash-based humanitarian (and 
resilience) interventions in highly volatile context. The first cash programmes took place in the mid-2000s 
and were closely followed and documented. Somalia’s trade-based economy and well-established hawala 
money-transfer system were credited with enabling successful interventions and challenging the dominance 
of food aid programmes (Ali et al., 2005). These early programmes were based on partnerships between aid 
actors and hawala companies, where the hawala was responsible for carrying physical cash to distribution 
points and the NGO responsible for selection of beneficiaries. 
The 2011 famine response saw a huge scaling up of cash-based programmes in a time of extreme 
humanitarian crisis and political uncertainty. This involved a scale-up of the Food and Agriculture 
Organisation’s (FAO) programmes and a consortium of NGOs working under the umbrella of UNICEF. To 
transfer the cash, they used a number of hawala money-transfer companies, including Dahabshiil, Amal, and 
other smaller players. 
Over the last 10 years, Hormuud telecom led the development of mobile money mechanisms. Many aid 
actors have moved from the previous system of working with hawala to utilising this system, often providing 
sim cards or telephones to beneficiaries to enable such transfers. The other key player in the past decade is 
WFP, which rolled out its SCOPE system in Somalia, working with Amal bank. This is an electronic voucher 
system using biometric identification. Vendors are selected and trained by WFP staff. These developments 
represent a shift to digital platforms in line with the evolving telecommunications and financial infrastructure 
in the country. 
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3. From food aid to cash – a shift 
in logistics and diffusion in power 
Food aid changed a lot. From direct WFP food aid 
to indirectly delivering it through local business 
community … along [with] cash transfer through 
mobile money transfer or WFP SCOPE card. This 
transformation is positive or negative depending 
on who is explaining (Governor of Baidoa, 2019). 
Food aid has long been a source of power in 
Somalia, whether by the wealth gained through 
diversion or taxation or the authority gained 
from distributing resources (either to buy off 
enemies or to reward supporters). This section 
takes the analysis further by examining the 
political and economic effects of changing 
logistics (transport, trade, money-transfer 
companies) with the shift from food aid to cash 
transfers and how this in turn influenced the 
political marketplace. Aid organisations have 
continued to face difficulties in reaching the 
most vulnerable populations. Food aid had a 
massive impact on the power of transport 
contractors, however, in that they were able to 
amass huge wealth and obtain political status 
and influence. As this section will show, the 
shift to cash transfers led to the involvement of 
more actors and more-dispersed political and 
economic benefits. It increased the ability of 
local authorities to buy or maintain political 
support. The switch to mobile money changed 
things again and contributed to the massive 
expansion of Hormuud, now able to invest in 
any profitable enterprise. Instead of buying 
political status or loyalty, however, it appears 
Hormuud buys political compliance to maintain 
an ever increasing and unregulated business 
empire. This section discusses each of these 
issues in turn. Overall, the section illustrates 
how the intersection between the 
commodification of food assistance and the 
commodification of politics changed over time. 
Did food assistance programmes meet 
their objectives? 
While it is beyond the scope of this study to 
review all evaluations and studies of food aid 
and cash transfer programmes since 2005, it is 
clear from key documents that humanitarian 
aims have rarely if ever been met. A 2008 study 
on food aid targeting reported large-scale 
diversion of food aid from IDP camps in the 
Afgoye corridor, in the midst of a humanitarian 
crisis (Jaspars and Maxwell, 2008). In 2010, the 
UN Monitoring Group exposed a massive 
scandal of WFP collusion with Somali 
businessmen to divert food (see more below). 
During the 2011 famine, the hardest hit areas 
could not be reached by international 
organisations (they were in Al-Shabaab-held 
areas) and so received little aid. In interviews 
with people from these areas, they said they 
sold land, lost livestock, their children died, and 
they migrated in large numbers to Mogadishu 
(and other towns) as well as to Kenya and 
Ethiopia in search of aid or work (Hedlund et al., 
2012: 27). The 2012 WFP evaluation (covering 
the 2006 to 2011 period) concluded that there 
was little understanding of the contribution of 
food assistance to food and nutrition insecurity 
in Somalia (Nicholson et al., 2012). 
Cash transfers have generally been reported on 
positively as providing choice for beneficiaries, 
improving access to food and dietary diversity, 
re-opening credit lines with local traders, and 
thus supporting markets and trading systems 
in Somalia (see for example Ali et al., 2005; 
Majid et al., 2007). In addition, the potential for 
diversion initially appeared to be less because, 
unlike food aid, cash is less visible. Before 2011, 
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cash programmes worked well because they 
were small new pilot projects with a huge 
interest in ensuring their success, which 
included significant investment in monitoring 
and evaluation. An advantage in Somalia was 
the strength of the market-based economy and 
the reliability of the hawalas (ibid.; ibid.). In 2011, 
given the absence of the main food aid 
organisations and the humanitarian 
catastrophe, cash transfers were really the only 
option for response and could be rapidly scaled 
up. An evaluation of the 2011 cash operation, 
however, highlighted ongoing diversion by 
gatekeepers, elders, NGOs, and cash-transfer 
agents (Hedlund et al., 2012). Also, because the 
bulk of cash transfers in 2011 was provided in 
accessible (government-held) areas, it drew 
people away from rural areas to displacement 
camps in Afgoye and Mogadishu, where a 
proportion was diverted by camp owners or 
landlords from different (often more powerful) 
clans (ibid.). Even when aid could be provided in 
rural areas, there are indications that it may 
have consolidated the occupation of land by 
stronger clans, as “landowners” were paid, and 
so facilitated the oppression of riverine 
populations (ibid.: 34). An FAO evaluation found 
that Bantu marginalised groups had been 
excluded from their cash-for-work programme 
(Buchanan-Smith, 2013), thus re-enforcing their 
marginalisation generally. Maxwell and Majid 
(2016: 130–8) furthermore note that meta 
evaluations revealed ongoing failures of 
targeting, taxation of implementing partners, 
beneficiaries, traders and money-transfer 
agents by local authorities and gatekeepers, 
and attempts by militia and authorities to 
influence targeting. A study on corruption in 
                                                   
7 The evaluation does not mention where access to rural 
areas was limited, but presumably this is in Al-Shabaab 
held areas in southern Somalia.  
humanitarian aid pointed out that the aid chain 
(UN, to international to local NGOs) was often 
part of networks of collusion and aid diversion 
(Harmer and Majid, 2016). This was despite the 
introduction of third-party monitoring, use of 
call centres, and greater monitoring and 
evaluation systems to mitigate these risks 
(ibid). Coverage of rural areas remained a 
challenge in 20177 (Daniels and Anderson, 
2018). WFP’s 2018 evaluation found that 
beneficiaries preferred cash-based transfers to 
food aid and that WFP’s operation had been 
credited with making an important contribution 
towards preventing famine in 2017. However, it 
also found that access to rural areas remained 
problematic – by late 2017, WFP was unable to 
reach 600,000 people considered extremely 
food insecure8 – and the evaluation team 
questioned that vulnerable households had 
been effectively targeted, or rather suggested 
that marginalized groups might have been 
excluded (Maunder et al., 2018). It appears 
therefore, while the modalities have changed, 
issues of access and manipulation remain. The 
remainder of this section delves deeper into the 
politics and economic effects of changes from 
food aid and cash operations, in particular of 
changes in the associated logistics. 
Big contracts and big politics – 
building capital through food aid 
transport 
Following a period of relative stability and 
limited food aid, from late 2006 food aid 
became one of Somalia’s biggest businesses 
again. Volumes of food aid dramatically 
increased following the Ethiopian ground 
offensive against the UIC, backed by US 
8 Again, the report implies that this is in Al-Shabaab areas 
but does not state so specifically.  
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airpower. WFP’s operation changed from 1.47 
million beneficiaries to 3.20 million – nearly a 
quarter of the population of Somalia. More than 
300,000 metric tonnes of food aid were 
distributed in 2009 (Nicholson et al., 2012). With 
such large volumes of food aid having to be 
distributed quickly, WFP had no choice but to 
work with big contractors. Only a few 
contractors were powerful enough to move the 
food, to provide a financial bond, and to deal 
with the militias. Three companies received the 
bulk of the transport contracts, worth $200 
million. It turned them into oligarchs (key 
informant 3, 2019). The companies were owned 
by Mogadishu-based contractors Abukar Omar 
Adaani, Abdulqadir Mohamed Nur “Enow” (both 
Abgal/Hawiye), and Mohamed Deylaaf (Habr 
Gidr/Hawiye). These names are important 
because in 2010, the UN monitoring group 
implicated them in the scandal of collusion 
between contractors, implementing partners, 
and WFP staff to divert food aid (UN Security 
Council, 2010). They had been WFP’s main 
contractors for 12 years, and they remain 
among the wealthiest businessmen in Somalia 
today. The monitoring group estimated a 
diversion of 30 per cent of food aid for the 
implementing partner and local WFP personnel, 
10 per cent for the ground transporter, and 5 to 
10 per cent for the armed group in control of the 
area (ibid.). Some of this was foretold in a 
targeting study in 2008, which noted a link 
between businessmen or traders, 
implementing partners, local authorities, and 
militia (Jaspars and Maxwell, 2008). With food 
aid contractors responsible for protecting food 
convoys, “WFP contractors have maintained 
some of the largest private militia in southern 
Somalia” (UN Security Council, 2010: 61). Food 
aid was also supplied cross-border from Kenya 
into Somalia. The two Kenya-based 
transporters we interviewed confirmed that the 
main reason they had worked for WFP or CARE 
was because it was the biggest business at the 
time (key informants 28 and 34, 2019). It was 
not only the volume of business but also the 
regularity and the reliability of getting paid that 
made transporting food aid attractive. Both 
were involved in other business at the same 
time, including commercial food transport, real 
estate, and cash facilitation. The latter 
facilitates cash transfers for international 
organisations in the absence of banks. The 
Kenya-based transporters also have much 
bigger businesses today than before they 
started transporting food aid. 
Food-aid contractors have also been engaged 
politically, at the highest levels. Several 
interviewees suggested that to be in politics in 
Somalia you first had to be in business, and to 
be in business you had to be in aid. WFP’s three 
Mogadishu-based contractors (see above) 
were involved in a range of political and 
economic activities. They controlled two of 
southern Somalia’s most strategic and lucrative 
ports: El Ma’aan to the north of Mogadishu, in 
which Enow and Adaani are partners, and 
Marka to the south of Mogadishu, which 
Deylaaf operated for over a decade. “In both a 
literal and figurative sense, these three 
individuals have long been “gatekeepers’ of 
WFP food aid to Somalia” (UN Security Council, 
2010: 62). Control over the ports, moreover, 
means some form of control over the 
population that is supplied by them. Adaani and 
Enow had previously been implicated in the 
arms trade and financing of armed groups, 
including the Union of Islamic Courts Union 
(UIC). They had a key influence on the evolution 
of both the Somali government and Al-
Shabaab. Adaani and Enow established a force 
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of 2,000 people to protect the port and its 
operations, which later formed the core of the 
UIC force that took Mogadishu in June 2006. 
When Ethiopian forces in turn took Mogadishu 
in December that year, Adaani supported the 
opposition, including Al-Shabaab. In 2009, 
following Adaani’s demands for political 
payback from President Sharif, the Islamist 
groups launched attacks on government forces 
(remember Adaani was still a WFP contractor 
at this time) (UN Security Council, 2010; key 
informant 3, 2019). Adaani also worked 
together with Hassan Sheikh when both were 
WFP contractors, with the latter becoming 
Somalia’s President in 2012 (key informant 3, 
2019). Although Adaani’s actions provide the 
most direct example of food aid’s role in Somali 
politics, the others were engaged more 
indirectly. For example, it is widely known that 
Enow’s wife obtained a seat in the parliament 
for her brother, but more broadly most 
informants suggested that political 
connections are essential to maintain a 
business. It also means that WFP was highly 
compromised as a humanitarian actor. 
Three things happened between 2008 and 2010 
that changed the food aid business. First, the 
US government designated Al-Shabaab a 
terrorist organisation (in 2008) and the US 
Agency for International Development (USAID) 
cut food to southern Somalia soon after. 
Second, CARE and other food-aid organisations 
left areas controlled by the group (in 2008). 
WFP left in 2010, “citing inability to meet 
humanitarian, security, and donor obligations” 
but likely also because of the report by the UN 
Monitoring Group. Third, Al-Shabaab banned 
                                                   
9 Adaani received a government contract to build roads in 
Mogadishu, without due process according to the UN 
Monitoring Group (UN Security Council, 2017).  
food aid in 2010, first restricting aid agencies 
from working in their areas and then banning 
them (Maxwell and Fitzpatrick, 2012) (also see 
Section 4 on Al-Shabaab’s strategies). The 
result was that food aid volumes dramatically 
declined and so did the potential profits to be 
gained from transporting it. As one long-term 
aid worker explained: “The big transporters are 
not interested in food aid now. The quantity has 
reduced and the risk has increased” (key 
informant 35, 2019). Kenya-based transporters 
felt that if they continued to transport WFP food 
aid, they would become Al-Shabaab targets. 
One of the transporters interviewed no longer 
travelled to Somalia at all. 
Having been involved in food aid transport 
when it was highly profitable, however, gave 
contractors the capital to invest in other 
business. A new class of “tender-preneurs” has 
emerged, who bid for security, port, or fuel-
supply contracts that are now worth more than 
aid. Aid workers, businesspeople, and 
government officials all suggested that Adaani, 
Enow, and Deylaaf are still the key players in 
some of Somalia’s largest business contracts, 
whether with aid organisations, AMISOM, or the 
government (key informants 3, 6, 34, 37, 41, 44, 
53, 59, 2019). One new business is construction 
(including real estate and infrastructure, for 
example, protection barriers for aid 
organisations or hotels, or building roads under 
government contracts).9 When Kismayo was 
controlled by Al-Shabaab, Adaani was one of 
the key businessmen involved in the export of 
charcoal and import of sugar (UN Security 
Council, 2011). Deylaaf, and a number of other 
former WFP or CARE contractors, are involved 
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in petroleum storage10 and supply, including in 
the green (safe) zone at Mogadishu 
International Airport (MIA) and the seaport, 
where they are also involved in customs 
clearance. Hassan Sheikh, Somalia’s President 
from 2012 to 2017, was also a shareholder 
(Hoffman et al., 2017), thus highlighting the 
ongoing political patronage of these influential 
businessmen and the importance of networks 
developed in the food-aid operation. They 
continue with road and air transport contracts, 
for example for AMISOM (key informants 34 
and 37, 2019). Many of the hotels, restaurants, 
and conference centres in the airport green 
zone are also said to be owned by former food-
aid contractors (key informants 37 and 44, 
2019), including Adaani. Not only did these 
former WFP contractors have the capital, but 
the bids are discussed within the airport zone – 
making it difficult for anyone outside to 
compete (key informant 37, 2019).11 One of the 
Kenya-based transporters continues to 
transport aid (but not for WFP) and has 
diversified into fishing and cash crops (eg, dried 
lemon and sesame – see Section 4). Enow has 
continued to work as a UN contractor; evidence 
from the UN Monitoring Group being 
considered insufficient to dismiss him and 
because he was not designated for targeted 
sanctions by the Security Council (UN Security 
Council, 2013: 368). 
By providing fuel to the UN and AMISOM and 
providing security, transport, and 
accommodation for aid organisations, the 
former food aid contractors continue to benefit 
from an ongoing humanitarian operation and 
                                                   
10 With a capacity of up to 100,000 MT in Mogadishu, 
according to one source. 
11 Think of all the logistics that the airport and the green 
zone involves. Shiploads of goods from South Africa arrive 
every month. Aid organisation representatives can pay up 
have an interest in maintaining it. So does the 
government. “Even the government is funded by 
these people, as sometimes the government 
runs out of money” (key informant 44, 2019). 
Others have suggested that government 
officials benefit financially from the contracts 
issued (but also that the new President is trying 
to stop this) and that this is a necessary 
business protection strategy. 
It is telling that petroleum is the sector in which 
many former food-aid contractors are getting 
involved. A number of informants suggested 
that oil will soon be the new big business and 
form the basis of the next battle for resources 
in Somalia (key informants 6, 30, 31, 2019). 
They suggested that – encouraged by donors – 
aid agencies work in areas with oil reserves (so 
their country will be considered more 
favourably with concessions) and that the 
Somali National Army (SNA) is encouraged to 
take control of areas with suspected oil 
reserves. Similarly, that the government is 
already offering concessions and selling 
seismic data in return for bonuses. It makes 
sense that if oil will be the new big business in 
Somalia that the country’s most powerful 
businessmen will want to get involved. 
A diffusion of power with changes in 
food assistance? 
As larger contractors shifted away from food 
aid (from 2011) and moved into other more 
profitable business, new – smaller – 
contractors moved into food assistance. As this 
section will show, it brought in more people, 
authorities, and organisations as well as new 
to $200 per night for accommodation inside the green 
zone.  
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actors and practices. But similar patterns of 
collusion and diversion continued – just at a 
lower level. To some extent the power 
dynamics also shifted from the national to the 
state level, hugely influencing the power of the 
district commissioners (DCs) and local 
organisations working in a particular area. At 
the same time, the new assistance and trading 
arrangements continue to enforce the power of 
the larger food-importing and trading 
companies, create a new oligopoly of 
communications and money-transfer 
companies, and maintain one for food 
importers. This section focusses on the 
diffusion of power, and the following sections 
on the consolidation of power within the 
telecoms and money-transfers companies 
(Section 3) and on large food traders (Section 
4). 
From 2011, food assistance consisted of some 
ongoing food distribution, usually in the form of 
food for work or food for assets, cash transfers, 
and vouchers. Consequently, transport 
requirements are fewer. In Gedo for example, 
food aid transport is now done by two or three 
small local transporters rather than the large 
companies of before (although all belong to the 
dominant Marehan clan) (key informant 4, 
2019). Cash transfers started in Somalia on a 
small scale in 2003 and 2004 (Ali et al., 2005). 
FAO started cash-for-work for key irrigation 
infrastructure in lower Shebelle, with the aim of 
rehabilitating canals and also meeting food 
needs. The number of beneficiaries was 
increased from 10 thousand to 90 thousand, as 
a first response to the emergency in 2010 (key 
informant 7, 2019). A small number of other 
organisations distributed cash in 2006 and 
more in 2011. Initially, cash transfers were 
mostly distributed through hawala such as 
Dahabshiil, but by 2012 mobile money had 
become the dominant way of transferring cash 
(see Box 2 on the evolution of cash transfers). 
Hormuud became the dominant telecoms 
company to provide this service for aid 
agencies, based on its mobile money-transfer 
system for the general public (see the next sub-
section). By 2019, mobile money and WFP 
electronic vouchers were the two largest 
means of providing cash transfers. 
A new system of food vouchers led to many 
retailers becoming involved in food assistance. 
By 2019, over 900 retailers had agreements 
with WFP to redeem food vouchers, a massive 
change from the limited number of big 
contractors before. Some of the retailers 
involved in the voucher programme had shops 
beforehand or had been involved in the 
purchase and sale of diverted food aid. This 
particularly applied to women petty traders in 
food aid, who had now become retailers in 
Mogadishu. Not all shops wanted to work as 
WFP retailers for fear of reprisals from Al-
Shabaab. A change in the food supply or 
transport system also had to be established. As 
for the retailers, some of the transporters 
involved used to transport food aid sold by 
those who diverted it. According to one 
transporter, “My business has evolved because 
I started as one who follows food aid – buy and 
sell – but I am now a wholesaler connected to 
food suppliers in Mogadishu, supply food to 
many retailers in Bay region and villages” (key 
informant 50, 2019). Two others said they had 
also bought and sold food aid before (key 
informants 54 and 56, 2019). This is one of the 
key differences with cash transfers: even if 
there is some diversion and collusion (see 
below), it does stay in the area where people 
need it, whereas food aid used to be shipped 
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out and sold immediately (key informant 50, 
2019). 
Retailers in turn have to make agreements with 
larger traders or importers to ensure they can 
meet the demand. The cash transfers rely on a 
new private-sector food-supply system. Most 
small retailers reported that this chain was 
small and that they often made arrangements 
directly with a number of larger traders and 
food importers. These traders or transporters 
then make the arrangements to cross between 
government and Al-Shabaab-held areas. This is 
discussed further in Section 4 on trade 
generally. One long-term aid worker in Gedo 
reported that much food supply to the region is 
now from Mogadishu rather than Kenya, with 
small companies transporting the food to Dollo 
on the Somalia-Kenya border. These small 
companies are, however, linked to large ones in 
Mogadishu that import food and that have 
agents in El Wak and Dollo. He suggested the 
creation of this new “line” was a direct result of 
cash transfers (key informant 4, 2019). These 
new food supply arrangements in response to 
cash transfers, and who controls it, need further 
exploration but it appears that ultimately 
access to food is still controlled by large 
businesses. Although the supply of food is left 
to the private sector, in some instances aid 
organisations will intervene, for example when 
they expect the demand to be high. This was 
done during the 2011 famine by senior officials 
from within the UN, who convened food 
importers in Dubai to prepare them for a major 
cash intervention. Both WFP and FAO 
representatives said they would prepare food 
traders in advance in this case. WFP also 
provides infrastructural support so that 
markets can function effectively. This may 
include post-harvest storage, transport 
infrastructure (eg, roads and ports), port 
procedures and customs, retail capacity and 
competence, and cold storage. The main aim is 
to deliver food as quickly as possible at the best 
price and ensure customer satisfaction (key 
informant 17, 2019). Although business has 
always dominated food and power in Somalia, 
the shift to cash and vouchers has taken this 
even further. 
Despite the positive aspects – of more retailers 
and transporters involved in food assistance, 
and thus ostensibly a wider distribution of 
resources – a number of informants reported 
that retailers are often owned by WFP staff (and 
purposely created to benefit from this system) 
(key informants 51, 52, and 53, 2019) or that 
you need to have connections with them or the 
local authorities to get the contracts to redeem 
vouchers. One retailer in Baidoa reported 
withdrawing from the programme because the 
beneficiaries were encouraged to go to shops 
owned by WFP staff: 
Yes, I am one of WFP-selected food vendors to 
redeem vouchers. There are a lot of challenges in 
that and I terminated their contract. Because WFP 
partners’ staff are the retailers; they have 
redemption shops created just for the vouchers, 
they go to the IDP camps and villages and order 
people to go to their shops, which means we do 
not get to redeem any vouchers. … there is no way 
to change because the same people you could 
complain have interest in the issue (key informant 
51, 2019). 
Another said she had to use all her 
connections to get the contract: 
Getting WFP vendor-ship was difficult but I used 
all possible connections to be included. No, it’s not 
just application. This business is decided by WFP 
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and partner NGOs’ staff and local authority and 
you have to be able to penetrate through to get in 
(key informant 54, 2019). 
The need to have connections to get WFP 
contracts to redeem vouchers has also been 
identified in other studies (see for example El-
Taraboulsi-McCarthy et al., 2017: 20). 
Key informants also reported that retailers can 
overcharge the beneficiaries. First, they may 
form a local cartel and agree on inflated prices 
for voucher recipients. For example, they add 
$2–3 to every 50 kilogrammes or so (key 
informant 25, 2019). Second, the retailers may 
give credit to the beneficiaries to buy food (as a 
means of making sure people will redeem their 
vouchers with them), “but the price of food goes 
up by the time the voucher comes, which 
means that as soon as the cash come in, the 
money goes to the businessmen – with 
interest, and the beneficiary accumulates debt” 
(key informant 4, 2019). 
Collusion between government, contractors, 
and NGOs also continues to be reported in the 
UN Monitoring Group for Somalia and Eritrea’s 
annual reports, as is diversion at all stages of 
the distribution cycle, including for cash 
transfers (eg, registration of fake beneficiaries, 
ghost camps, taxation) (see also Majid and 
Harmer, 2016). In addition, with the 
concentration of aid in urban areas from 2011 
onwards, the local authorities and in particular 
the district commissioner have gained an 
enormous amount of power (key informants 51 
to 55, 2019). These issues are discussed 
further in Sections 5 and 6. 
                                                   
12 Three telecommunication companies built on al-
Barakaat’s previous telecommunication facilities and 
infrastructure: Hormuud in south-central Somalia, Golis in 
The rise of the money-transfer 
business: Hormuud, Amal, and others 
If something happened to Hormuud, the whole 
country would collapse (key informant 38, long-
term aid worker, 2019). 
Cash transfers as a form of aid provided by 
international organisations have contributed to 
the massive growth of a limited number of 
telecoms companies and banks in Somalia, in 
particular Hormuud. From the time that 
Somalis started migrating to the Middle East, in 
the 1970s and 1980s, money-transfer systems 
have been important. At first, people used the 
“franco valuta” service, which involved giving 
funds to traders from the same clan, who pay 
migrants’ families with proceeds from sales. 
Large-scale displacement in the 1980s and 
1990s increased demands for money transfer, 
which then changed into hawala, or the transfer 
of debt. The customer contacts an agent who 
instructs another agent to pay. Debt is settled 
later (Lindley, 2009). Hawala agents were 
incorporated into larger enterprises specialising 
in money transfer, often run by livestock and 
goods traders. New technologies were rapidly 
incorporated, and agents were later 
transformed into remittance companies. Some 
may have built up capital through food-aid 
brokering (ibid.). Lindley (2009) writes that by 
2008, two main companies had emerged: 
Dahabshiil and Amal. Al-Barakat had been a 
major company before, but it fell when its 
accounts were blocked by US anti-terror 
legislation.12 She also suggests that the 
concentration of resources within a few 
businesses illustrates the effect of market 
forces in the absence of a state. The managers 
Puntland and Telesom in Somaliland (Hagmann and 
Stepputat, 2016: 10).  
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of money transmitting agencies were “well-
shod entrepreneurs”, many from pre-war 
business dynasties (ibid.: 528). By 2000, 
companies started offering the services of 
small banks (eg, Dahabshiil – savings for large 
investments, such as a house or business, or 
loans). 
A further transformation took place with the 
advent of “mobile money” transfers, which led 
to the expansion and domination of Hormuud. 
Hormuud has become the main telecoms 
company in south-central Somalia (with Golis in 
Puntland and Telesom in Somaliland). The 
company was established in 2002, and it 
started mobile money in 2012, which soon 
became the main way for aid organisations to 
provide cash transfers. According to one 
informant, 90 per cent of aid-cash transfers are 
done through Hormuud (key informant 19, 
2019). Another speculated, “in 2016 and 2017, 
the aid target was $1.5 billion. Suppose the 
humanitarian community raised $1 billion. Sixty 
to 70 per cent is cash transfer – and this is 
dominated by one company.” This is likely to be 
an exaggeration but highlights the large 
amounts of aid funds being provided as cash 
transfers. 
While some claimed that the impact of cash 
transfers on Hormuud is minor compared to 
remittances, a representative from the 
company itself says it has grown enormously 
since the start of cash transfers as one of the 
main aid modalities in Somalia (key informant 
12, 2019). According to a Hormuud 
representative, when the company was 
established in 2002, it consisted of 20 to 30 
people; but it now has 12,000 shareholders. The 
number of aid organisations it works with has 
also expanded. It first handled cash transfers 
for Concern in 2012 and now does so for 48 
other organisations, the biggest being FAO. 
ICRC and FAO alone may be transferring $1 
million and $2.5 million per month respectively 
(ibid.). The company not only charges aid 
organisations a fee (said to be as “little” as 1 per 
cent), for new beneficiaries, aid organisations 
also have to buy phones and SIM cards (key 
informant 27, 2019). However, in terms of 
power, what is also important is the amount of 
cash held by the company. It essentially 
performs some of the functions of Somalia’s 
central bank and can invest in almost every 
profitable enterprise (see below). While WFP 
uses Amal to pay its retailers, and some 
organisations still used Dahabshiil, in 2019, 
Hormuud was by far the most powerful 
telecoms and cash-transfer agency, with some 
informants arguing that it has become the most 
powerful actor in Somalia. In addition to money 
transfer within Somalia, Hormuud owns “TAJ 
money”, for international mobile money 
transfers, and Salama bank, the largest 
commercial bank across Somalia. 
Hormuud has made a range of large 
investments with the cash that it holds. 
Numerous informants provided information on 
what they are investing in (key informants 1, 4, 
12, 15, 16, 24, 27, and 37, 2019). This ranges 
from honey production, food imports (including 
sugar, flour, and rice), to Benadir electricity and 
water supply, real estate (in Kenya and 
Somalia), agricultural land along the Shebelle 
river, and urban land in Mogadishu. Milk 
production, food processing, and milling were 
also mentioned. This means Hormuud controls 
much of Somalia’s food production and trade, 
as well as its telecommunications. With the 
purchase of agricultural land, it is involved in the 
production and export of cash crops, including 
lemon (see below). The control of food imports 
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appears to be significant. According to one 
informant, 80 per cent of sugar imported to 
Gedo was done by Hormuud (key informant 4, 
2019), and another said that it is the only sugar 
importer into Somalia (key informant 27, 2019). 
Like with the telecoms industry, it could flex its 
financial muscle to create a monopoly. 
According to one food importer, “All food 
importers lost a lot of money in 2017 and 2018 
because of Hormuud pressure to reduce prices 
so that other importers left the market and it 
could dominate” (key informant 57, 2019). This 
needs further investigation. Other ventures 
include fishing, taxis, and the hotel business. 
Investment in fishing fleets followed a request 
by a Chinese company, because Hormuud has 
the capital to buy new ships. The taxis entail an 
Uber-like ride taxi app and the importation of 
hundreds of cars. Real estate includes hotels as 
well as urban housing. In summary, Hormuud 
has entered all markets where a profit is to be 
made, in any sector. Furthermore, it cross-sells 
services: in Mogadishu, competitors allege that 
Hormuud bundles electricity and telecoms 
services (Hagmann et al., 2018: 37). Although 
Hormuud is by far the largest investor out of the 
cash transfer businesses, Dahabshiil also 
invests in real estate and agriculture, including 
cash crops in lower Shebelle, such as banana 
and lemon (key informants 37 and 45, 2019). A 
representative from Amal said they did not 
invest in such business in Somalia but invested 
in real estate in Kenya. 
Other telecoms or money-transfer companies 
find it hard to compete. The UN and USAID are 
still using Dahabshiil (key informant 24, 2019), 
and WFP uses Amal bank to pay its retailers but 
their business empire is dwarfed by Hormuud. 
Some interviewees believed that Amal and 
Dahabshiil will come up again, as at the 
moment these two still dominate transfers 
from abroad. Amal is one of the biggest micro-
finance providers in Somalia, including for NGO 
programmes but has only just started with cash 
transfers. Its link with WFP, however, to pay 
retailers that redeem vouchers, has already 
meant its business has doubled. About 15 other 
UN agencies also use Amal bank. This could be 
in part because Amal has a relationship with 
Standard Chartered bank, giving it an 
advantage in terms of regulatory and risk cover 
(Goodman and Majid, 2018). At the time of the 
fieldwork for this study, it was working to 
establish mobile money, and hoped that by 
allowing others to use the platform for a fee 
(which Hormuud does not), it will be able to 
compete with Hormuud (key informant 33, 
2019). Dahabshiil has also grown in the past 10 
years, and was the biggest actor for aid cash 
transfers and remittance facilitator from 2011 
to 2015 (key informant 60, 2019). In 2017, it 
introduced E-Dahab (for mobile money 
transfer) but to date has not become a serious 
competitor for Hormuud. 
The companies also claim they are at risk of 
attack, in particular from Al-Shabaab. 
According to the Hormuud representative, the 
main obstacles to their operation are 
“insecurity, resource sharing, demands for 
taxation, and the lack of a justice system” (key 
informant 12, 2019). In 2018, Hormuud was 
targeted by Al-Shabaab in Mogadishu but it did 
not give in to demands for money, and after 
three months they stopped. One way that 
Hormuud tries to minimise security risks is to 
be involved in social activities. For example, 
through its foundation it has established a 
school for the blind (El Nur), Hormuud 
University, an NGO that responds to floods and 
disasters, and a fire brigade for Mogadishu. It 
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also uses private security services in 
Mogadishu, and has its own militia. Amal 
similarly reported it has become a target for Al-
Shabaab, because it works for the government 
and for the UN. Its manager in Mogadishu was 
shot at its Bakara office in early 2019 (key 
informant 33, 2019). At the same time, it is 
questionable how much of this risk is actually 
coming from Al-Shabaab as these companies 
are also paying taxes to them. It could be that 
this narrative has been created by the telecoms 
and money-transfer industry to stop the 
government from imposing regulation. 
Collecting money, as sometimes with WFP 
cash transfers, does pose a risk for 
beneficiaries. As one long-term aid worker 
commented: “If collecting money from Amal, 
people have to queue. This poses security 
issues. People can collect their money over a 
seven-day period, but still people go in one 
group – for transportation and for security 
reasons. So many people drawing money also 
attracts attention” (key informant 37, 2019). 
From the beneficiary perspective, therefore, 
mobile money is safer; thus Amal feels 
threatened business wise and is working on a 
mobile money-transfer platform. 
The telecoms industry is vital to the functioning 
of Al-Shabaab and vice versa. Almost all 
regions, districts, and villages in Somalia are 
covered by mobile networks, and an 
overwhelmingly high number of the population 
– including poor, destitute, and displaced 
people – have basic phones. This made mobile 
money transfer to and within rural areas 
possible (key informant 47, 2019), including 
those held by Al-Shabaab. In fact, maintaining 
these networks is key to Al-Shabaab’s 
functioning and the telecoms business in Al-
Shabaab-held areas is arguably more important 
than in those held by the government. 
According to one group of long-term aid 
workers, when the federal government wanted 
to register SIM cards, Al-Shabaab could lean on 
Hormuud to bribe government officials not to 
implement this (key informant 10, 2019). The 
telecommunications bill was passed in 2017 
after many government attempts and what 
some suspected was resistance by Hormuud. 
Hormuud is able to exert influence as many 
politicians are shareholders, and of the seven 
people on the government telecoms 
committee, five are associated with Hormuud. 
While some informants suggested that the 
telecoms and money-transfer companies do 
not want regulation, the telecoms companies 
themselves claim that a secure environment 
would be better for their business. In case of 
disputes, however, they currently go to Al-
Shabaab courts rather than the government. It 
could be argued, therefore, that in the end Al-
Shabaab holds a veto over key government 
decisions on telecoms regulation. 
To conclude, despite the changes from food aid 
to cash transfers, the power attained through 
food assistance remains concentrated within a 
few businesses and individuals. Large 
companies gained wealth and power through 
transport contracts and diversion. With the shift 
to vouchers, large traders (including import) 
supply local retailers, and now a limited number 
of companies manage cash transfers for aid 
organisations (dominated by Hormuud). With 
this, the intersection with the political market 
place has changed from the political patronage 
and aspirations of large contractors to a more 
dispersed marketplace for buying political 
loyalty, and one large money-transfer operator 
that is able to buy off government officials to 
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continue to expand its business. Traders and 
money-transfer companies are also 
increasingly involved in cash-crop production. 
This is discussed further in the following 
section. 
4. Shifts in production and trade; 
maintaining vulnerability and 
power 
In the villages we come from, we Somali Bantu or 
Jareer are being wiped out because whenever 
there is drought or floods, Abgaal take advantage 
and buy all our land and literally we will have no 
place (IDP representative in Mogadishu, 2019). 
Control over land and production in Bay and 
Bakool and along the Shebelle and Juba rivers 
has long been contested in Somalia, with many 
of the original inhabitants facing discrimination, 
exploitation, and dispossession by government, 
warlords, or militias. This section explores how 
this political economy has evolved. The 
majority of informants reported that the 
production of food crops like maize and 
sorghum had decreased and that cash crops 
like sesame and dried lemon had increased 
over the past 10 to 15 years. This shift is due to 
a number of factors: first, displacement of large 
numbers of farmers; second, Al-Shabaab 
taxation policies; third, the lower market value 
of food crops – which by some has been linked 
to food assistance; fourth, changing 
consumption patterns (and therefore a 
dependence on imported food); and fifth, the 
possibility of quick profit from sesame or lemon 
with minimum labour and other inputs. A 
number of informants, including government 
officials, IDP representatives, and aid workers, 
also mentioned repeated drought and floods. 
These factors are intimately linked to who has 
power over production and what they do with it, 
and this section discusses each of these 
factors in turn. The section also illustrates how 
the power and political patronage of Hormuud 
and of large traders is further boosted by 
investment in cash crop production, but that 
this increases the vulnerability of marginalized 
and minority farming and agro-pastoral groups, 
who are displaced from their land. In addition, it 
shows how Al-Shabaab enters the political 
marketplace by effectively facilitating 
displacement. It re-enforces the food 
assistance-business connection. Business in 
turn, sustains Al-Shabaab through taxes on 
imports, trade, and production. 
Displacement, food assistance, and 
reduction in food crops 
The starting point in analysing production has 
to be the extent of displacement from rural 
areas under Al-Shabaab’s control. Its policies 
were blamed for displacement by our 
interviewees. Long-term aid workers usually 
referred to this in quite general ways, for 
example a tax on production, with a couple of 
informants specifying one bag of produce out 
of every ten produced (eg, key informants 14 
and 37, 2019), or one bag for zakat tax and one 
for jihad (key informant 25, 2019). An IDP 
representative mentioned taxes on everything: 
planting, weeding, and harvesting (key 
informant 65, 2019). All reported that the 
taxation was high. At the same time, some 
argued that farmers support Al-Shabaab 
because it provides stability and security 
(compared to government and militias), which 
is needed to complete a full agricultural cycle 
(key informant 18, 2019). At first, Al-Shabaab 
promoted production, in that its representatives 
encouraged planting on time, rehabilitated 
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irrigation canals, and continued to allow FAO’s 
production support while they banned 
organisations providing food aid (key 
informants 2 and 7, 2019). Minority or 
marginalised clans initially supported Al-
Shabaab because of its policy of land 
restitution, in particular when land has been 
taken by force. Al-Shabaab was able to take 
much territory quickly by advocating for equal 
distribution of resources among all clans (key 
informant 7, 2019). In land disputes, minority 
clans can claim their rights in Al-Shabaab 
courts. Moreover, almost everyone, including 
businesspeople, considers the Al-Shabaab 
court system more effective than that of the 
government (eg, key informants 7, 12, and 47, 
2019). In contrast to the government, Al-
Shabaab has full control over its areas and has 
a well-structured command system (key 
informant 30, 2019). These contrasting 
perspectives (high taxation and displacement 
versus support for production) appear to cover 
different time periods. Since the loss of urban 
areas (and thus its administration in these 
places) in 2014, Al-Shabaab has gone from 
supporting production to a survival policy of 
increasing taxes (key informant 25, 2019), 
where local commanders increasingly 
determine the strategy in their area, including 
how much tax is charged (key informant 4, 
2019). Alternatively, Al-Shabaab’s strategies 
may vary by area and in consistency. The UN 
Monitoring Group reported an increase in 
taxation of the harvest and humanitarian 
assistance (and an ongoing ban on the formal 
humanitarian sector) and an increase in 
checkpoint fees in 2016 (UN Security Council, 
2017). Traders, however, still find Al-Shabaab’s 
taxation easier to deal with than the 
government’s. As long as you have paid your 
tax once, you will not be asked to pay the same 
tax again, which they say is not true of 
government. One trader also commented that 
“of late they have accepted us to work with the 
government and NGOs so long as we pay them 
their taxes” (key informant 50, 2019). The rise of 
the Islamic courts, and of Al-Shabaab, has been 
linked to the rise of big business and its need 
for security, which the UIC and later Al-Shabaab 
were in a better position to provide than any 
other authority (including various incarnations 
of the Somali government) (see for example 
Ahmad, 2015). The alternative was to pay huge 
amounts to the militias for security. 
The link between food assistance and 
production is complex. Since 2010, Al-Shabaab 
has progressively banned Western – and 
particularly US – aid, and the organisations that 
provide it. As Al-Shabaab controls much of the 
productive land in Somalia, including the fertile 
areas of Bay and Bakool and along the Juba and 
Shebelle rivers, those who are in theory able to 
produce food are not receiving much food 
assistance. Some have argued, however, that 
food aid itself undermined production even 
before Al-Shabaab banned WFP and others. 
According to Ahmad (2012), WFP broke 
farmers’ livelihoods by delivering consistently 
at harvest time. Crop prices reduced and people 
stopped farming. This in turn strengthened the 
business-warlord alliance with an interest in 
maintaining aid. This is a strong assertion 
although both aid workers and government 
officials interviewed echoed this concern (key 
informants 20, 27, 41, and 42, 2019). The 
negative effect of food aid on production was 
also a consideration in Al-Shabaab’s banning of 
food aid (Harper, 2019: 195). The more 
common concern ascribed to Al-Shabaab 
(including by some of our interviewees) is the 
suspicion that aid organisation are spies or 
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agents of the West or that they are in Somalia 
simply for their own economic benefit 
(Jackson, 2014). 
Considering the ongoing manipulation of food 
aid in Somalia, it is not surprising that Al-
Shabaab banned it. The marginalised clans that 
form the support base for Al-Shabaab have 
persistently been excluded from food 
distribution or exploited and abused to attract 
food aid, and those who benefited have 
consistently been the more powerful clans now 
dominating government and big business.13 On 
the other hand, with the existing disputes over 
land and the absence of a political settlement, it 
is difficult for aid agencies to invest in land or 
rural infrastructure. Even providing inputs or 
tractors can be problematic as this assists 
landowners over labourers (key informant 2, 
2019). The banning of food aid to rural areas, 
and the famine this helped create, has meant 
many farmers left their land (or were forced to 
leave – see below). This ultimately must have 
reduced food production even further and 
concentrated displaced populations and food 
distribution in towns, which also changes 
consumption patterns. It also continues to 
benefit government-aid organisations and 
business cartels (see Section 7 for more 
discussion on this) and facilitates land grabs for 
the production of cash crops (see below). 
Drought, floods, lack of agricultural services, 
and maintenance of canals are secondary 
reasons for decreased production and/or 
displacement. Lack of equipment and services 
means that farmers are unable to clear the 
bush in riverine areas, and canals silt up (key 
informant 14, 2019). Canals along the Shebelle 
                                                   
13 Support by minority groups for Al-Shabaab is also 
complex. One the one hand, many joined possibly because 
they saw a chance for revenge or for greater equality. On the 
river have not functioned for many years 
because of inter-clan conflict, with one tactic 
being to obstruct canals (key informant 7, 
2019). From 2008 to 2010, Al-Shabaab 
organised some rehabilitation, but this ceased 
when it lost its administrative centres. The 
history of land-grabs has also left many original 
land owners working as labourers on small 
plots of land, thus making them more 
vulnerable to drought or floods. 
Finally, it must be reported that even though 
official estimates confirm the reduction in food 
crops (see World Bank and FAO, 2018), these 
figures are disputed, with some arguing they 
could be underestimates. Access to the areas 
that produce food crops is limited, and it is 
difficult to get reliable estimates of production. 
While an increasing number of farmers have 
been displaced, some remain and some return 
on a regular basis (depending on proximity to 
original farms), including family members of 
those who are displaced (key informants 66, 68, 
and 71, 2019). The large numbers of displaced 
people, however, tends to confirm that 
production has been negatively affected. In 
addition, if land has been sold, there is no way 
of going back. Land grabbing through forced 
sales, rather than through violence, appears to 
be a common trend with the increase in cash 
crop production. This is discussed below. 
Increase in cash crops, sale of land, 
and consolidation of land for 
commercial farming 
The main cash crops produced in Somalia 
today are sesame, lemon, and banana, with 
large profits to be made when demand is high. 
other hand, forced recruitment has been reported, and even 
in Al-Shabaab, marginalised groups are the foot soldiers and 
the more powerful clans are in charge (see eg, Harper, 2019).  
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Making large profits involves acquiring and 
consolidating land and having exploitable 
labour. While banana has historically been the 
most lucrative cash crop, lemon and sesame 
production has increased in the past 10 to 15 
years. Sesame and lemon production increased 
because it requires less water, labour, and 
infrastructure than food crops or banana. 
Sesame production was also promoted by Al-
Shabaab (Majid and McDowell, 2012). A shift 
from food crops to sesame was noted during 
the famine of 2011 as a quick way of making a 
profit, but it ultimately left some people more 
vulnerable as they no longer had food stores. 
They invested their money in cattle, which died 
quickly in the drought conditions (Maxwell and 
Majid, 2016). Banana production along the 
riverine areas has been problematic during the 
conflict because the crop is perishable and 
requires reliable transport and storage 
infrastructure. Investment in banana may be 
increasing again, however (eg, in Afgoy or 
Jowhar), with slightly greater stability in the 
Shebelle region (key informant 45, 2019). The 
increase in banana production is also linked to 
the increase in domestic demand. This sub-
section first discusses changes in production 
and then how an increase in commercial 
production is linked with land sales and 
displacement. 
Sesame production has fluctuated over the 
past 10 to 15 years, with businesses investing 
and promoting production whenever global 
demand has been high. Informants have told us 
that production increased enormously from 
around 2006 to 2010, went down in 2015 to 
2017, but seems to have peaked again from 
2018 onwards. As with food crops, getting 
reliable estimates of production is difficult, so 
they vary widely. Data in a World Bank and FAO 
report (2018: 27) show little change in 
production since 2005 from FAO data and 
highly fluctuating figures using Food Security 
and Nutrition Assessment Unit (FSNAU) data. 
This is contradicted by export data. The same 
report states that recorded exports of sesame 
seeds fell back to about $34 million in 2015 
after reaching a peak of $40 million a year, 
although they also note that major Somali 
exporters believe that these figures grossly 
underestimate actual export revenues. A report 
from the Somali Agriculture Technical Group 
(SATG) estimates $300 million a year in 2014 
(SATG, 2016). A similar estimate was made in 
2018, when the country’s sesame export was 
on the rise again and Somalia became the 
world’s eighth largest producer (Somali 
Enterprise, 2019). The rise is due to increased 
demand from the Middle East, India, and China. 
Sesame is grown in rain-fed areas and along the 
rivers, usually in the der season, or short rains 
later in the year. When people talk about 
sesame replacing food crops (which are usually 
grown in the gu or long rainy season), they may 
mean in terms of volume, ie, fewer food crops 
are grown and sesame is now grown for export 
(key informant 45, 2019). Small farmers grow 
sesame but production for export is usually 
supported by large businesses that consolidate 
land and that then use share-cropping 
arrangements. Diaspora are also involved, with 
more investment along the Shebelle river 
because areas of contention around land are 
well-defined and because transport to 
Mogadishu is easier. Along the Juba river, many 
more clans have been involved in land take-
overs (ibid.). Only the larger farmers can pay Al-
Shabaab’s taxes to export it out of their area 
(key informant 25, 2019). 
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Growing lemon or banana crops is also a larger-
scale commercial activity along the two big 
rivers. Lemon production almost doubled 
between 2012 and 2014, due to an increase in 
demand in Dubai, Iran, and the Emirates. Fresh 
lemon is sold to local traders, and dried lemon 
to exporters (SATG, c2016). Several big traders 
or businessmen have encouraged the planting 
of lemon in Gedo, Shebelle, and Hiran (key 
informants 4 and 16, 2019) and provide credit, 
inputs and information.14 According to one 
long-term aid worker, businessmen pay 
farmers $2,000 to $3,000 in subsidies for 
growing lemon (key informant 4, 2019). Both 
militarily dominant clans and big companies are 
buying land for cash-crop production (key 
informant 61, 2019). In some cases, 
“landowners” pay militias as gatekeepers to 
take care of their farms (key informant 37, 
2019). Exploitation has been a key aspect of 
banana production (see earlier section) and is 
feared to be a feature of lemon production too. 
Few buyers control the market, which means 
farmers get low prices for their products (SATG, 
c2016). 
Increased investment in the production of cash 
crops is associated with the sale of land by 
politically weaker or poor farmers. The majority 
of displaced representatives interviewed 
reported that they sold their land to the 
powerful clans in their area before leaving. In 
Bardera, Gedo, for example, several villages 
were reportedly bought by Marehan (the 
dominant clan in the area) during the droughts 
of 2011 and 2017 (key informant 48, 2019). 
IDPs in Mogadishu reported selling their land to 
powerful Hawiye (eg, Abgaal) with business, 
political, and aid connections, and aid workers 
                                                   
14 Local traders, in contrast, have moved out. Bu’aale, for 
example, had 30 traders before the area came under Al-
reported a similar trend (key informants 19, 49, 
67, 69, 71, and 72, 2019). This applies 
particularly to already marginalised Bantu 
clans, some of whom reported the deliberate 
creation of their desperate conditions, which 
forced them to sell their land (see the quote at 
the start of this section). This is a continuation 
from earlier trends where they had to sell land 
to pay for protection (key informant 16, 2019), 
or violent land-grabbing in the early stages of 
the conflict, or as part of Siad Barre’s regime in 
the 1980s. A similar trend may be occurring 
along the Juba Valley, as the majority of people 
in the Kismayo feeding centres are Bantu (key 
informant 1, 2019). This appears to contradict 
Al-Shabaab’s policies of solving disputes over 
land and supporting marginalised groups in 
regaining land taken by force. Al-Shabaab is not 
protecting marginalised or minority clans from 
having to sell land because of an inability to 
make ends meet, whether as a result of taxes, 
lack of support, or gradual dispossession. In 
addition, the land may be sold to companies 
paying taxes to Al-Shabaab and thus 
contributing to the survival of Al-Shabaab itself. 
This issue needs further exploration. 
In Bay and Bakool, a similar trend can be seen, 
but with land bought by better off people from 
the same clan (key informants 47 and 65, 
2019). In Bay region, powerful clans include the 
bigger Rahanweyn clans. According to one IDP 
representative in Baidoa, “Over 60 per cent of 
the IDPs were either pastoralist … or farmers 
who sold their land. Better off people in the 
village buy it, and thus acquire bigger land-
holdings.” Others confirmed that most IDPs in 
Baidoa had sold their land (eg, key informants 
19, 47, and 66, 2019). According to one long-
Shabaab control, but now only have one or two. They all 
moved to Kismayo (key informant 16).  
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term aid worker, 
There has been a change in land-grabbing from 
the 1990s. Before, one clan mobilised against 
another. Now … if there are two minority 
settlements, powerful clans build three villages 
around it. Then they cut off their access to 
resources … taking advantage of the peak of 
drought … (key informant 19, 2019). 
As a result of these land sales, some farms are 
now as large as 100,000 acres, run by business 
groupings, sometimes with links to the 
diaspora (key informant 19, 2019). As 
mentioned in Section 3, Hormuud is one of the 
big companies investing in land. According to 
one informant, it now owns 5,000 to 10,000 
hectares of commercial land in Shebelle, and as 
such it is the biggest investor. Dahabshiil is also 
involved (key informant 37, 2019). It, and others, 
are consolidating land from different “owners”. 
As they see this as a future investment, they 
may even buy above the market value, for 
potentially profitable land. At the same time as 
the big companies are investing, some mid-size 
companies are also emerging, particularly in 
sesame. This appears to be the crop of choice 
for new diaspora companies (key informant 45, 
2019). 
Trading in food – export of cash crops 
and food imports as big business 
With most agricultural land in the south 
controlled by Al-Shabaab, and a shift from food 
to cash crops, trading patterns have also 
changed. Cash crops like lemon, sesame, and 
banana have to be transported out of Al-
Shabaab areas, and consumption needs are 
mostly met by imported food. As expected, 
much of this is controlled by Al-Shabaab and 
large businesses. 
Traders informed us that goods move easily 
between government and Al-Shabaab areas, as 
long as the necessary taxes and checkpoint 
fees are paid. The export of cash crops from an 
Al-Shabaab area is often linked to the sale of 
food imports through the same chain of village 
retailers, traders or transporters, and 
import/export businesses. For example, as one 
transporter from Baidoa explains, 
The main exports were lemon and sesame. … this 
season we bought a lot of sesame and exporting 
it. [The way it works is that] we supply imported 
food to our clients in the villages and they supply 
sesame with an agreed price on both 
commodities. We see our business growing and 
we are working hard to make sure that we grow 
and become the biggest, best and efficient food 
supplier in Bay and Bakool regions (key informant 
52, 2019). 
Other traders interviewed reported a similar 
chain, which of course also met the need of 
retailers redeeming vouchers (see above). 
Sometimes those bringing in aid (eg, the 
remaining in-kind aid to Gedo) also bring back 
cash crops such as lemon from the Juba Valley 
to Kenya (key informant 28, 2019). According to 
one wholesaler in Baidoa, all food importers and 
exporters are from non-Rahanweyn clans: “we 
literally work for others while we are the market 
because our people are poor” (key informant 53, 
2019). A long-term aid worker suggested that 
those involved in import/export businesses 
were mostly Hawiye (key informant 5, 2019). On 
the other hand, Rahanweyn are now more likely 
to be smaller traders or distributors and 
retailers. 
The export of lemon and sesame has been a 
relatively new phenomenon in the past 10 to 15 
years, with lemon exports more tightly 
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controlled than sesame. Lemon is controlled by 
a small group of buyers, or exporters, based in 
Dubai and Mogadishu. With only one main 
market, in Dubai, they can fix the price (key 
informant 45, 2019). Several big traders 
(encouraged by Dubai businessmen) have 
come to the riverine areas and encouraged the 
planting of lemon trees. These same buyers 
sometimes bring rice and sugar from 
Mogadishu to sell or as part of the payment 
(key informant 4, 2019). Farmers have little 
choice in terms of who they sell to. One 
informant suggested that “compared to 
livestock, lemon is the biggest business 
[Somalia is also a big exporter of livestock]. Big 
ships [with lemon] leave the port monthly” (key 
informant 41, 2019). This likely reflects only 
trade centred around Mogadishu; the major 
livestock exports from Somalia are through 
Berbera and Bosasso in the north and Garissa 
in Kenya. 
Sesame exports appear to be controlled by a 
few companies that export to the Middle East, 
the Gulf, China, India, and others (key 
informants 11, 16, 39, 44, and 45, 2019), 
although we received varying estimates as to 
the number of companies involved. There 
appear to be more players than in lemon. 
However, farmers still have no choice but to sell 
to the big companies, who can set the price and 
pay the taxes. The other issue is a lack of 
reliable information on the supply chain. As one 
informant explained: “When you reach demand, 
there is no smooth decline. [The system] goes 
into oversupply. … the farmer cannot 
understand market capacity because there are 
too many middlemen, and they give incentives 
to keep producing” (key informant 11, 2019). As 
a result the market regularly collapses. There is 
also a domestic market, and more Somali 
companies are investing in processing, to sell 
oil rather than the seeds. 
Food imports have risen by a factor of 18 since 
the 1980s, reaching almost $1.5 billion in 2015, 
up from an annual average of about $82 million. 
According to a World Bank and FAO report 
(2018), the reasons for the increase include 
domestic demand for food (mostly for cereals, 
sugar, and other processed foods) and the 
collapse of domestic staple crop production. 
Both of the former food aid contractors have 
been involved in food imports, and so have the 
money-transfer agents, for example Hormuud 
for sugar. The importance of food imports to 
the country makes control over them, including 
over the ports themselves, an important way of 
controlling the population. As one long-term aid 
worker commented, “the biggest change with 
federal government has been the re-
organisation of Somali administrative areas 
around economic infrastructure such as ports, 
main road, airports” (key informant 31, 2019). 
The administrative regions are organised 
around four ports and other infrastructure, even 
if some of this has to be newly built in response 
to the political-administrative geography of the 
federal member states. Previously, the two 
ports of south-central Somalia were Mogadishu 
and Kismayo. Under the current dispensation, 
the boundaries of South West State have been 
drawn so as to include Merca, and a new port at 
Hobyo is being discussed for Galmudug, and 
Hirshabelle will need a different port (perhaps El 
Ma’an). 
Al-Shabaab has control over both food imports 
and transport. Because traders and 
transporters see Al-Shabaab as less corrupt, 
and as providing better security, some will 
prefer a longer route via Al-Shabaab areas 
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rather than a shorter one through government 
areas (key informant 31, 2019). Al-Shabaab can 
also ban certain foods or suppliers (key 
informants 50 and 52, 2019). Most recently, 
since April 2019, Al-Shabaab has been taxing 
commodities brought in containers into 
Mogadishu port. According to one importer, 
“The shipping companies were summoned by 
Al-Shabaab. They went to the government and 
the government told them to deal with Al-
Shabaab and solve the issue. The shipping 
companies and Al-Shabaab agreed that they 
will share the shipping waybill and information 
on the number of containers and owners with 
Al-Shabaab, who will call owners to pay the tax. 
A 40-feet container is US$160 and 20-feet 
container is US$100 (key informant 53, 2019). 
Other importers confirmed this. Ultimately 
therefore, the most powerful groups in food 
production and import appear to be Al-Shabaab 
and business lords. 
The political economy of food, in terms of 
control over land and production, has evolved 
with the increase in cash crop production. 
Despite much productive land being under Al-
Shabaab control, commercial cash crop 
production, trade, and food imports, are still 
controlled by a limited number of businesses – 
with often the same business involved in all 
three. The concentration of production, money 
transfer, and aid resources to a few actors, has 
arguably worsened the exploitation of 
marginalised and minority groups, many of 
whom have been displaced. This in turn 
maintains the aid-business connection. 
Maintaining big business also relies heavily on 
a post-revolutionary Al-Shabaab (for whom 
money and power is stronger than ideology), 
both in terms of facilitating displacement and in 
controlling or facilitating food movement and 
trade. As such it also enters the political 
marketplace, because it influences the ability of 
business to buy political influence, and because 
it taxes investment in production, trade, and 
food imports. Maintaining the status quo – in 
terms of food production, trade, and power – 
benefits both business and Al-Shabaab. 
Whether and how this is seen and analysed by 
contemporary aid practices is considered in the 
next section. 
5. Regimes of aid practices: 
neoliberalisation and making 
politics invisible 
[With cash it is] in many ways much easier to feel 
you know what is going on, but you really do not … 
(key informant 1, long-term international aid 
worker). 
No one is asking why we are doing the same thing 
over and over again for ages. No one wants to ask 
questions (key informant 20, long-term Somali aid 
worker). 
Food aid is more than a gift or a commodity. It 
is also a regime of practices or an assembly of 
policies, practices, organisations, and 
authorities and their underlying science and 
ideology. Such a regime can also be seen as a 
way of governing from a distance (see 
Foucault, 2007), in that it attempts to guide 
people’s actions or behaviour or to manage 
populations. It also has political and economic 
effects that were perhaps not intended by some 
of the organisations involved. Section 3 covered 
one aspect of this, the effects of the logistical 
apparatus associated with food aid and cash 
transfers. This section examines the changes in 
practices such as assessment, targeting, and 
monitoring and how this regime works within 
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Somalia’s environment of conflict, Al-Shabaab 
and militia attacks, and limited access. 
Food assistance in Somalia has experienced 
problems of manipulation and diversion of aid 
and other resources for the past 30 years or so, 
and these are well-known among donors and 
aid workers. In the 1990s, the politics of control 
over food was evident for all to see and was well 
covered in the literature, not only in Somalia but 
also elsewhere (see for example Macrae and 
Zwi, 1994; African Rights, 1997). This section 
argues that with changes in practices and 
ideologies, these issues appear to have become 
less visible. In Food Aid in Sudan, Jaspars 
(2018) divides food aid practices into three 
regimes: a state-support regime, a livelihoods 
regime, and a resilience regime. The same aid 
regimes can be applied to Somalia. During the 
state-support regime, food aid practices 
explicitly supported the state, whether through 
direct bilateral aid or project aid (including aid 
for refugees), and in the livelihoods regime food 
aid largely bypassed the state and was provided 
direct to populations by NGOs or the UN. In 
Somalia this modality of bypassing the state 
continues up to today, but from 2012, the food 
aid regime took on a resilience ideology similar 
to that in Sudan a few years earlier (Maxwell 
and Majid, 2016: 169). The resilience regime of 
food aid or food assistance practices is 
characterised by a shift towards market-based, 
privatised, and individualised responses, with 
the latter focussed on treatment and behaviour 
change (Jaspars, 2018). In both Somalia and 
Sudan, remote management is another key 
aspect of the resilience regime, which has 
made it possible to maintain one reality of 
progress and efficiency with new technology 
and another of inequality, exploitation, and 
diversion of aid. In this section, we also make 
use of the concepts of frontstage and 
backstage in the humanitarian theatre as 
proposed by Desportes et al. (2019). The idea is 
that in the performance of humanitarian actors, 
there is a stark contrast between their 
frontstage performance, where response is 
exemplary or at least improving based on new 
practices, coordination, and decision-making. 
Backstage, however, is where the ongoing 
effects of politics and power relations on 
humanitarian response is acknowledged and 
discussed. 
From food aid to cash and nutrition 
Informants from international and national 
organisations said that post-2011, a key shift 
had occurred in Somalia from food aid to cash 
and nutrition. Nutrition interventions involve 
both the distribution of specialised food 
products and nutrition education. Cash, 
specialised nutrition products, and behaviour 
change feature prominently in Somalia’s 
resilience regime and are key aspects of the 
frontstage performance. In WFP’s strategic 
plan, for example, these interventions are 
expected to contribute to increasing food 
access for food and nutrition insecure 
populations and to their ability to withstand 
shocks, as well as treat and prevent 
malnutrition (WFP, 2018). Nutrition education 
(or “messaging” in the WFP strategy) is 
expected to contribute towards resilience. Cash 
transfers are also expected to improve 
resilience through strengthening the banking 
system, fostering local markets and food 
systems. The linked biometric registration is to 
form the basis of a future government-led 
social safety net (ibid.: 10). “Social and 
behaviour change communication” (SBCC) 
forms a key part of both nutrition and cash 
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programming and includes education on child 
feeding, household food choices, water, 
sanitation and hygiene practices, and health-
seeking behaviour. Some of WFP’s cash 
transfer programmes are conditional on 
participating in SSBC, productive activities, 
vocational training, clinic attendance, or going 
to school. The funds requested for improving 
services, infrastructure, and government 
institutions – as part of promoting resilience – 
is minimal compared to those allocated for 
cash (or vouchers) and nutrition. Other 
organisations also see cash transfers as a 
means to achieving resilience, whether through 
cash-for-work to repair agricultural 
infrastructure (eg, FAO) or cash grants, which 
affect borrowing and access to credit (Somalia 
cash consortium) (FAO, 2018; Somalia Cash 
Consortium, 2013). Other resilience strategies 
include the provision of agricultural inputs, 
infrastructure, and services. 
As such the frontstage practices of the 
resilience regime create a simplistic picture of 
the causes of malnutrition and food insecurity, 
placing principal responsibility for nutritional 
failures on individuals and families, in contrast 
to the complex structural political and 
economic causes discussed in previous 
sections. This picture is re-enforced by the way 
assessment, targeting, and monitoring is 
currently done. The assumption that 
malnutrition and food insecurity is simply a 
function of individual choice and capacity is 
seriously flawed and dangerous as it has the 
potential to feed into the ongoing 
discrimination of historically marginalised 
groups. This report argues that such a 
simplistic analysis needs to be challenged with 
an analysis of power, distribution, and class as 
part of a political economy analysis of cash 
transfers (see for example Johnston, 2015). 
This is discussed further below. This hyper-
neoliberalisation of international aid practices 
(ie, focusing on individual responsibility and 
market-based approaches) directly and 
indirectly supports the domination of business 
in the control of resources in Somalia. The role 
of business is evident in every aspect of the 
current aid regime. In the previous sections, we 
have shown the role of business in the logistics 
and infrastructure of aid. Much of assessment 
and monitoring is also privatised in Somalia, not 
only because of NGOs’ involvement but that of 
private companies. At the same time, these aid 
practices hide the ongoing process of 
concentrating power in a limited number of 
businesses and the exclusion of the most 
vulnerable. As the manipulation of aid and its 
impact on the Somali political economy has 
been demonstrated numerous times, it takes 
some effort to hide it. Limited access, remote 
management, and new cash and nutrition 
practices have made it possible. The remainder 
of this section discusses first the changes in 
assessment, targeting, distribution, and 
monitoring and then how these practices have 
made key aspects of food and power in Somalia 
invisible. 
Changes in assessment, targeting, and 
monitoring 
Changes in access and attempts to address the 
problems of the past, as well as ideology, have 
created new practices that form part of the 
frontstage performance. Access for 
humanitarian organisations to populations in 
south-central Somalia changed dramatically 
from 2007 and 2008 with the rise of Al-Shabaab 
(Hammond and Vaughan-Lee, 2012). This 
occurred not only because of Al-Shabaab’s ban 
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on Western aid but also because of their 
attacks on aid workers and increased conflict 
between Al-Shabaab and government and allied 
forces. As long-term international aid workers 
explained: “It is much more difficult to 
understand the situation now, compared to 
before. It seems that the ignorance of the 
international community is increasing. [Aid 
workers] are behind concrete blocks” (key 
informant 11, 2019). “You cannot have good 
understanding of the context and people 
without somehow being there” (key informant 1, 
2019). 
While FAO in general could continue to access 
Al-Shabaab held areas, its assessment unit, the 
Food Security and Nutrition Assessment Unit 
(FSNAU) could not because Al-Shabaab 
suspected them of spying. FSNAU in turn 
dominates food security and nutrition 
assessments in Somalia. FSNAU made a 
number of changes in response to restricted 
access to rural areas but not until 2015. From 
2012 to 2015, much of rural Somalia was 
essentially excluded from assessments. After 
this, two main approaches were used. First, 
asking key informants to come into urban areas 
and, second, phone interviews with informants 
in Al-Shabaab controlled areas. In addition, in 
2016, new quantitative indicators – the food 
consumption score, household hunger score, 
and coping strategies index – were added to 
FSNAU’s assessments (key informants 16 and 
38, 2019). WFP, although also relying on FSNAU 
for estimating needs, has itself gone further 
with remote assessments (although only in 
government-held areas), some of which are 
done through a mobile phone checklist, in 
particular in what it calls “hotspots” to follow up 
on FSNAU’s information. As one informant 
explained, “Before we used ‘paper questions’, 
now we work with mobile phone users. … The 
questions are simplified, just have yes or no 
answers or multiple choice. The data 
immediately go to Nairobi – into SPSS [a 
computer programme for statistical analysis]. 
We also do rapid assessments using call 
centres. We can call fifty households and find 
out immediately what is happening in the area” 
(key informant 25, 2019). There certainly 
appeared to be a perception among those we 
interviewed that current methods are better 
than those used earlier. Other WFP information 
collection includes market monitoring, early 
warning (eg, prices, markets, displacement, 
livelihoods), and ad hoc food security and 
market assessments (key informant 32, 2019). 
Examples of this are a detailed analysis of food 
and nutrition insecurity (WFP, 2015) and a 
context analysis (WFP, 2019). WFP also 
commissioned a nutrition causal analysis in 
southern Somalia. These are discussed further 
below. 
In terms of targeting and distribution, the 
Somalia food security cluster developed new 
community-based targeting guidelines in 2018, 
to overcome the problems that occurred in 
2012 (Somalia Food Security Cluster, 2018). At 
that time, many of the most vulnerable were 
excluded from distribution, and diversion by 
gatekeepers, elders, and NGOs was a major 
issue (Hedlund et al., 2012). The new guidelines 
provide detailed guidance on how to identify 
and target the most vulnerable and how to 
mitigate potentially negative effects such as 
violence and stigmatization against vulnerable 
groups. However, what they do not do is 
highlight the need to examine power relations 
and the process by which some people become 
vulnerable (and others gain power). 
Furthermore, agency staff are often part of 
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these dynamics (Haver and Majid, 2016; Majid 
and Harmer, 2016; El-Taraboulsi-McCarthy et 
al., 2017). They also do not refer to earlier 
targeting studies in Somalia, for example those 
done or supported by WFP in 1999 and in 2008 
(WFP, 1999; Jaspars and Maxwell, 2008; 
Narbeth, 2002). As Keen (1994) has pointed out, 
an analysis of power relations is essential in 
understanding whether targeting the vulnerable 
is possible. In most cases, politically weaker 
groups fail to access sufficient relief because 
they lack political muscle within their society 
(ibid.). It is therefore important to understand 
who does have the political muscle, how they 
control resources, and why, before attempting 
to target aid at the most vulnerable. In Somalia, 
past targeting studies have repeatedly pointed 
out the futility of targeting on the basis of socio-
economic criteria – as in most cases it is either 
shared widely among everyone within a 
particular community or subclan or the most 
powerful receive more. WFP’s latest evaluation 
questions again the assumption that 
community-based targeting is an effective 
mechanism for targeting the most vulnerable 
(Maunder et al., 2018) as does a recent report 
on social protection (Goodman and Majid, 
2018). The question is then why does the aid 
community persist in its attempts to target the 
most vulnerable despite repeated evidence that 
this is difficult or impossible to do in Somalia? 
In our interviews, traders, transporters, aid 
workers, and IDP representatives all said that 
INGOs, local authorities, and camp owners 
determine who gets aid, and that vulnerable 
communities (minority and marginalised clans) 
are (still) excluded or have to hand over part of 
their aid, even though a change has been made 
from food aid to vouchers or direct cash 
transfers. Backstage, marginalisation, and 
exclusion continues. In addition, in Baidoa and 
Mogadishu, this means that backstage both the 
district commissioners (DCs) and INGOs have 
become more powerful, as previously WFP 
worked directly with elders and local 
committees. This may provide part of the 
answer (see also Section 6 on the role of 
government). 
Furthermore, a number of informants 
suggested that the main diversion happens at a 
higher level: 
Diversion happens at a much higher level; ie, with 
geographical targeting. A lot of questions would 
be asked [of FSNAU] if there was a census. For 
example, famine in 2011 was first identified in 
central region – but the only real place where 
famine occurs on a regular basis is South West. 
IPC 4 is always in central and Puntland. But in SW, 
you have the marginalised, conflict affected and 
agro-pastoral populations. These are more 
vulnerable (key informant 36, 2019). 
Big diversion is at the higher level. Selection of 
villages, and of people. This has reduced with new 
modalities [but diversion happens in different 
ways] (key informant 4, 2019). 
WFP’s latest evaluation also raises a number of 
issues about the FSNAU assessments, 
including about not adapting its livelihood 
sampling frames, lack of reliable population 
data, and the reliability of its nutrition data 
(Maunder et al., 2018). 
Food security assessments, whether by WFP or 
FSNAU, or analysis by the Integrated Phase 
Classification (IPC) do not capture some of the 
social and political dynamics of food insecurity 
and malnutrition. A recent food security and 
nutrition trend analysis concludes that 
populations in central regions are more food 
insecure, more often, than those in Bay and 
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Bakool (WFP, 2015). Given the ongoing control 
of resources by powerful individuals or 
businesses, and their dependence on exploiting 
minority groups, including in Bay and Bakool, it 
would seem extraordinary that populations 
living in these areas would not be among the 
most food insecure. Furthermore, the 
populations in the central regions are among 
the best connected in Somalia through their 
social networks to urban areas and the 
diaspora and did not suffer famine in 2011 
(Maxwell and Majid, 2016). The IPC, like the 
FSNAU data on which it is based, frequently 
identifies food insecurity in the central regions, 
however (See Box 3 on the IPC, its objectives, 
and its flaws). What is equally worrying is that a 
nutrition causal analysis, which focusses on 
causes at the household or individual level, 
concludes that poor feeding and hygiene 
practices are key causes of malnutrition (SNS 
Consortium, 2015). This in itself can be 
expected to feed into the discrimination of 
Rahanweyn, Gabaweyn, and Bantu, who suffer 
the highest rates of acute malnutrition, and 
which allows their exploitation to continue. A 
more recent WFP integrated context analysis 
concludes that some areas in which these 
populations live do experience chronic food 
insecurity due to non-climatic factors, but also 
that other parts of Somalia experience 
protracted and/or seasonal food insecurity due 
natural shocks (WFP, 2019). 
 
 
 
Box 3: Integrated Phase Classification in Somalia 
The IPC (Integrated Phase Classification) system was developed within the FSNAU, in Somalia, in 2004, and has 
since expanded as an analytical process and dissemination mechanism. The use of the IPC has expanded 
beyond Somalia and is now recognised globally as the largest provider of current-status information about food 
security and related crises. In Somalia, the FSNAU and the IPC represent a form of knowledge management that 
influences decisions on the appeal and allocation of international resources. 
The value of the IPC is in its set of protocols that provide a structure and platform to integrate multiple data 
sources, methods, and analyses to generate consensus-based situation analyses. As such it can be used flexibly 
to bring together different data types and analysts around the same table (FAO, 2012). However, as such it is 
also limited by the availability and quality of data and of the (human) analysts involved, and in turn by the 
methodological biases and power dynamics inherent to the particular context, including the political economy 
of the aid industry itself. In the case of Somalia for example, the 2011 famine was well predicted by the FSNAU 
(and the Famine Early Warnings Systems Network – FEWSNET) but a major factor in the unfolding of the disaster 
was the political dynamics at the time, namely the restrictions of Al-Shabaab and the counter-terrorism 
legislation of the US; as Dan Maxwell highlights, “What is clear is that it was politics – more than drought, prices, 
or even armed conflict – that effectively prevented early action in Somalia in 2011” (Maxwell, forthcoming). 
Furthermore, new research findings, generated from the 2011 famine, identified that the “social connectedness” 
of families – their ability to reach relatives removed from the immediate disaster context, such as in towns and 
cities and in the diaspora – was a critical factor in their ability to survive the extreme conditions at the time. 
These connections also reflect the business and political links between rural and urban areas that are a factor 
in relative vulnerability. It is unclear whether such research has been factored into the IPC analyses in recent 
years (Maxwell and Majid, 2016). 
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In addition to asking questions about the 
reliability and impartiality of the information on 
which geographical targeting is based, 
informants talked about two other ways that 
cash transfers were still subject to diversion. 
First, additional SIM cards or vouchers are 
registered for local authorities (eg, the DC) to 
“pay” for representation (the addition of 100 
extra cards or vouchers was often mentioned) 
and, second, IDPs continue to pay a tax to camp 
land owners or gatekeepers, the amount 
mentioned most frequently was 30 per cent of 
the money they received. 
WFP ATM cards or food vouchers are redeemed 
by selected food vendors and/or banks. There is 
no problem to redeem but we have to pay our 
masters the camp owners, if they know we have 
said this that is the end me (key informant 67, 
2019). 
If you get your voucher or ATM you can redeem it 
easily but you have to pay the camp owner his part 
which is 30 per cent of whatever you get. This was 
agreed when you settle in the camp … If you don’t 
pay the camp owners you don’t get any benefit, if 
they don’t like you they never include you in the 
beneficiary list (key informant 68, 2019).15 
In theory, this kind of diversion is caught by third 
party monitoring, a key change in aid 
programming initiated in 2016 and 2017. This 
includes the use of call centres to follow up 
mobile cash transfers, or with separate NGOs 
to monitor receipt of aid on the ground. As one 
international informant explained, “With mobile 
cash transfers, you have more of a paper trail in 
terms of what is happening with the money. 
Food, once it leaves the warehouse, you just get 
                                                   
15
 Majid and Harmer (2016) provides examples of taxation 
in the range of 10–20 per cent. 
a waybill signed by someone. With money, 
telecoms gives you the number, and you can 
follow up. You can call and verify the data, 
name, phone number, etc. That is what we did. 
One hundred per cent verification. For every 
beneficiary list we would lose 25 per cent, 
because phone number did not work, or the 
name was not on the list” (key informant 1, 
2019). On the other hand, Somali informants 
commented that monitoring NGOs might take 
bribes to give the distributing NGO a good 
report and also complained about collusion 
between monitors and auditors (key informant 
24, 2019) and observed that both the 
implementing NGO and the monitoring NGO 
had to belong to the majority clan of the area to 
be able to function – implying a risk of collusion 
(key informant 4, 2019). 
Another new element of monitoring is risk 
management units within big organisations. 
This might entail, for example, checking the 
background of contractors or who they have 
worked with in the past, and checking them 
against UN sanction or terrorist lists. However, 
political affiliations more broadly are not 
necessarily analysed (key informant 23, 2019) 
and powerful businessmen operate under a 
number of different company names. Others 
may check links between staff and contractors 
or links between staff and local authorities. 
However, even if such evidence of corruption or 
collusion is found, it is rare that big 
organisations would suspend their operations 
on the basis of this (key informant 41, 2019). 
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Making politics invisible 
These new practices on the frontstage make 
the political economy of food in Somalia 
invisible in a number of ways. First of all, as 
much programming is done remotely, and 
decision-making does not actually rest with 
those who are present, getting a good 
understanding of the dynamics of food security 
in Somalia is difficult. Relying overwhelmingly 
on quantitative methods and simple yes/no 
questions on mobile phone checklists rather 
than the in-depth knowledge of long-term 
Somali aid workers or food security specialists 
makes this even harder. As Duffield has noted 
(2019a), in humanitarianism we have seen a 
shift from knowledge gained from being 
present to remoteness and electronic data, 
leading to very different understandings of the 
world. Knowledge allows for causal reasoning, 
theorizing, and critique whereas data is more 
concerned with empiricism, statistical analysis, 
alerts, and dimensions of human behaviour 
(Duffield, 2019a). A focus on individual 
behaviour places responsibility for malnutrition 
and food insecurity on crisis-affected 
populations themselves, thus hiding its 
structural causes (see also Jaspars, 2018). In 
Somalia, there are a number of other elements, 
such as not assessing dynamics of cash-crop 
production or including clan politics in food 
security or context analysis that make politics 
invisible. Furthermore, the language of 
promoting business and client satisfaction 
associated with vouchers and cash transfers is 
fundamentally different from that of aid 
agencies and beneficiaries. It changes the 
sense of human obligation to that of an 
impersonal transaction (Scott-Smith, 2016). 
International organisations’ admiration for 
business and innovation may also have 
contributed to making an understanding of the 
role of business in concentrating power, 
political patronage, and the exploitation of 
labour, invisible. Finally, given that issues of 
food and power, which include corruption and 
collusion in aid, have such a long history in 
Somalia, it is possible that international 
organisations and their donors actually no 
longer want to know. These issues are 
discussed below. 
In Somalia, food security assessments focus 
on staple crops and on the poor. This means 
that the shift to cash crops, exploitative labour 
relations, and land grabs are not captured at all. 
“In FSNAU, the focus is on food crops. Cash 
crops are only considered in terms of labour – 
mainly sesame. For lemon and banana it is not 
really the poor that farm these crops [so they 
are not monitored]” (key informant 38, 2019). 
Another informant speculated that assessing 
only food crops, when they had long ago been 
replaced by cash crops, was also a way of 
keeping food aid coming: “Gedo consisted of 
riverine livelihoods and agro-pastoral groups. 
The baseline concentrated on staple crops but 
when food aid was pushed on small farmers, 
they shifted to lemon and sesame … when 
assessments were done, it showed there was 
no farming [so justifying food aid]. Now they are 
no longer covering Dollo, perhaps because no 
improvement?” (key informant 26, 2019). 
Even though since the 2011 famine there is a 
renewed awareness of issues of 
marginalisation and exclusion, organisations 
find dealing with the power dynamics difficult. 
Aid organisations recognise that incorporating 
clan issues into their analysis is essential for 
gaining an understanding of why some people 
are able to access food and others not, but have 
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find this difficult to put in practice. A key issue 
is how to do this in a way that is acceptable to 
all concerned and that does not pose a risk. As 
a result, food security and nutrition analysis 
contain little or no information about conflict or 
issues of political marginalisation and 
exploitation of certain clans. Somali staff do 
know the political causes of food insecurity but 
are not encouraged to share this knowledge, or 
it is not reported officially as part of 
assessments. Staff are also part of the power 
dynamics. This results in food security 
assessments that contradict what should be 
known on the basis of a political and economic 
analysis. Populations that would be expected to 
be most food insecure are not necessarily so 
according to the analysis conducted by FSNAU 
and others. As the highest levels of acute 
malnutrition are found in Bay and Bakool 
regions (and in the riverine populations), this 
means that organisations have started looking 
for other causes of malnutrition. The recent 
nutrition causal analysis, in fact, concludes that 
feeding and hygiene behaviours are key causes 
of malnutrition, although climate, insecurity and 
seasonal factors also play a role (SNS 
Consortium, 2015). Given the well-known 
history of political marginalisation and 
exploitation of particular clans such as the 
Rahanweyn, Gabaweyn, and Bantu groups, and 
the occurrence of the most severe famines 
among these groups, it seems extraordinary 
that this explanation of malnutrition causation 
is accepted among aid organisations. These 
population groups have now been made 
responsible for their own malnutrition. And if 
their own actions are responsible for their 
malnutrition, are they by extension also 
responsible for causing famine among 
themselves? The findings of the nutrition 
analysis can be found back in the WFP strategic 
plan. The strategic plan highlights women’s 
workload, girl marriage and early motherhood, 
restrictions on mobility, lack of reproductive 
health services, and discriminatory socio-
cultural beliefs about childcare and health-
seeking practices as key causes of malnutrition 
(WFP, 2018). Although lack of mobility and 
discrimination can be linked to conflict and 
exploitation, here it is linked to childcare and 
feeding practices, thus actually feeding into the 
discrimination and exploitation of certain ethnic 
groups. 
Behavioural factors as causes of malnutrition 
can also be found back in the linking of nutrition 
interventions and cash transfers with behaviour 
change communication. Johnston (2015) is 
one of the few researchers that has done a 
critical analysis of cash transfers, which are 
conditional on behaviour change (in her case 
for those at risk of HIV). She first of all points 
out that there is little evidence that such 
interventions are in fact successful in bringing 
about behaviour change. However, more 
importantly, she points out the flawed 
assumptions on which these interventions are 
based: that recipients of behaviour change 
communication have a choice in what they do. 
Simple messages aimed at behaviour change 
fail to consider the wider structural factors that 
put people at risk, and depoliticises the 
structural drivers of – in her case – HIV risk in 
southern Africa. The role of inequality in access 
to resources, including employment and health 
care, and in gender relations, is ignored: “… the 
oversimplified premise of these projects edits 
out politically difficult questions of power, 
distribution and class” (ibid.: 410). The same 
can be said of the causes of malnutrition and 
food insecurity causation in Somalia. By 
focussing on individual actions and choice (in 
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both cash transfer and nutrition strategies), the 
political and economic processes that lead to 
inequalities in the distribution of land, 
production, and aid, and the exploitation and 
exclusion this involves, is edited out. 
Furthermore, accepting that some people are 
malnourished because of their own actions 
itself feeds into the ongoing discrimination of 
these groups, as exemplified by one of our 
interviewees: 
Some people are at a low level. They are different 
in terms of their civilisation. For example, the 
Bantu have had low level traditions for a long time. 
They are not armed. Cultural things keep them 
low. Those factors still affect minority groups. No 
power, no arms, low culture. They do not have the 
same system of support within the community. In 
Bay and Bakool, the farming systems are bad, 
they have collapsed completely. Pastoralists can 
move and have better kinship support. So the 
problem is mostly cultural. [We] can give support 
through aid, but this does not form the base of the 
economy. The Bantu communities, the way they 
live, marry, or spend money, this would be very 
difficult for pastoral communities. They take more 
wives, instead of building and saving. In Bay and 
Bakool, they have one administration but a large 
number of people and their socio-economic 
status is low. It’s just a different civilisation – they 
also have fewer diaspora. It is their own culture 
that is keeping them malnourished (key informant 
30, 2019). 
While the vast majority of organisations would 
not endorse this statement, it is implicit in 
today’s food security and nutrition strategies. In 
addition, if malnutrition and food insecurity is 
largely a result of people’s own actions, 
international organisations are no longer 
responsible for feeding into unequal power 
relations through the way they distribute aid. It 
may actually suit both donors and international 
organisations for the ongoing political 
manipulation of aid and other resources to 
become gradually invisible. It keeps the aid 
operation going without having to be 
accountable (and this also benefits others – 
see Section 7). 
Many long-term international aid workers 
commented that they did not really know what 
is going on in Somalia and that, when providing 
aid, the priority is not always on trying to 
understand the context, as illustrated in the 
following quotes: 
As external actors we have no clue what is really 
going on. … We don’t know whether or not we are 
reaching the most vulnerable. We are not honest 
about what we are doing. Everything is brilliant 
when you write a proposal – holistic, 
complimentary, then after one year: find fraud, etc. 
Then when you submit a report, everything is 
brilliant. It is difficult to have a grown-up 
discussion with anyone about this. People do not 
want to know. For donors, it complicates their life, 
colleagues do not want to know, etc. (key 
informant 1, 2019). 
Humanitarian assistance is no longer about 
assisting the most marginalised. The focus is on 
meeting quantitative objectives, for example the 
number of people assisted. What to do? How? [Aid 
organisations] are either not interested or not 
willing to take the risk of knowing who your 
partners are, and the risk this poses to the 
Somalis. Also less attention is given to the 
interlocutors who represent the marginalised (key 
informant 13, 2019). 
We are not trying to get equal distribution to each 
clan. Just want to deliver food as quickly as 
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possible at the best price. Get quality food, at the 
right cost, on time. Trying to get aid to actual 
locations (key informant 17, 2019). 
Long-term Somali aid workers commented 
mostly that it appeared donors were just not 
interested in what is really happening in 
Somalia, but appear to be following their own 
agenda, as these quotes show: 
The donors do not ask: who are we supporting? Is 
anyone left out? [Dominant groups] make use of 
the loopholes in the international community. It is 
also difficult for international organisations to 
monitor (key informant 15, 2019). 
Within the aid system, there is no accountability. 
No continuation among international staff. People 
on the ground benefit. No one is asking why are 
we doing the same thing over and over again for 
ages. No one wants to ask questions (key 
informant 20, 2019). 
[Aid organisations] are part of the problem 
because they only want to have an easy job, they 
don’t want to challenge authorities and major 
clans. Most of the staff are part of the 
marginalization process and collude with local 
authorities (key informant 49, 2019). 
These quotes perfectly reflect the frontstage 
and backstage performances in Somalia’s 
humanitarian theatre. Frontstage, there are new 
cash transfer and nutrition practices, and 
people can become resilient by changing their 
behaviour and by promoting business and 
market-based approaches. New remote and 
quantitative methods are quicker, cheaper, and 
more efficient, and new guidelines on 
identifying the vulnerable can make sure they 
are targeted with aid. These new practices, 
however, along with the focus on behaviour 
change and individual responsibility, is making 
politics and power invisible. The politics is only 
seen backstage, where everyone knows power 
is concentrated within a few powerful 
businesses and that marginalisation continues. 
The diversion and manipulation of aid and its 
use in boosting power and political patronage 
also continues. Many aid actors are part of both 
the front and backstages, but there is no 
incentive for interaction between the two. Both 
international and Somali informants suggested 
there is little honesty in aid programming. This 
is backed up by findings of the UN Monitoring 
Group in 2013, that found a culture of denial and 
secrecy that prevents the humanitarian 
community from sharing bad experiences, a 
lack of follow up on implementation and quality, 
inadequate termination clauses, and a narrative 
that has nothing to do with reality. They 
attributed this partly to inconsistent donor 
responses to diversion (UN Security Council, 
2013). It could also be that most organisations, 
and the companies they work with, benefit in 
different ways from not being held accountable 
and thus maintaining the status quo. Not 
knowing, or blaming crisis-affected 
populations, facilitates this. For aid workers it is 
better focus on the frontstage, keep aid 
resources coming in, and claim ignorance of 
backstage discussions. There is no incentive 
for interaction between the two. 
Focussing on maintaining the front stage, 
however, means that the political and economic 
processes that lead to inequalities in the 
distribution of land, production, and aid, and the 
exploitation this involves, are made invisible 
and continue. So can the use of food assistance 
to boost political power and patronage. The 
food insecurity and malnutrition that these 
processes produce will persist. The frontstage 
keeps the aid operation going but does not 
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address the causes of malnutrition and food 
insecurity. 
6. Role of government? 
They come with ready-made food and then ask us 
what we want to eat (government official talking 
about NGOs, key informant 62, 2019). 
Somalia’s federal government is a minor player 
in the political economy of food in Somalia, 
compared to business and aid actors. It 
controls only a small part of the revenue stream 
and is the weaker party in any negotiation, 
compared to the business sector (De Waal, 
2019). The donor and aid communities also 
have more power than the federal government 
does. Government officers are beginning to 
question and resist their power but at the same 
time need the resources they offer to attract 
and maintain their political budget. Al-Shabaab 
continues to pose a key challenge to the 
government, as it holds much of southern 
Somalia. One informant commented that 85 per 
cent of Somalia is out of bounds for the 
government (key informant 36, 2019). This 
keeps donor resources to maintain the FGS, 
and to expand the area it controls, coming in. 
This section first discusses the limited power of 
federal government ministries at the central 
and state levels, how they attempt to change 
this and what they are doing, and then contrasts 
this with the power of the district 
commissioners through their effective control 
of aid locally. The analogy of the frontstage and 
backstage again works well here. Frontstage, 
federal government ministries work together 
with the UN and other aid organisations to 
develop policy. Backstage, adopting what are 
essentially donors policies can be seen as a 
form of extraversion (a means of using their 
dependency to attract external resources), 
which is at the same time also resented, and the 
use of external funds to maintain systems of 
political patronage continues. 
Limited role of federal and member 
state ministries in regulation 
Government officials at the federal level have 
limited power to regulate or to control revenue. 
One way of attracting resources, is to align 
themselves with international policies and 
strategies such as resilience, scaling up 
nutrition, etc (frontstage). At the same time, 
they face pressure (backstage) to attract 
resources for themselves and their clan. 
Maintaining the existing regime of practices is 
one way of keeping the aid flow coming in. This 
includes the policies, the information systems, 
and the various organisations and authorities 
that are involved. This subsection discusses 
each in turn. 
Many government policies are closely aligned 
with or even the same as those of their major 
donors. The national development plan, for 
example, with resilience as its focus, reveals 
similarities to the priorities of the international 
community (Federal Government of Somalia, 
2017a). The national development plan aims to 
produce resilient communities and the Drought 
Impact and Needs Assessment (a joint donor, 
UN, and government exercise) refers to the 
capacity of government, households, and 
communities to deal with and recover from 
natural shocks and conflicts (Federal 
Government of Somalia, 2017b). Child feeding 
and hygiene practices as a cause of persistent 
acute malnutrition, rather than the 
marginalisation of certain groups, can also be 
found back in the national development plan 
(ibid.: 109). Other priority areas in the National 
Development Plan include security, the rule of 
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law, governance, infrastructure, clean water, 
energy. It emphasises agriculture, livestock, 
and fishing and building on the strengths of the 
private sector. It seems Somalia’s national 
policies are decided based on the priorities of 
outsiders. For example, the government has a 
resilience working group consisting of 
government, donors and UN agencies. Most 
recently, a new Somali social protection policy 
was produced with extensive input from WFP 
and UNICEF. 
Not surprisingly, government ministries are 
closely aligned to specific UN organisations. 
According to one government advisor, UN 
organisations have become Somalia’s service 
delivery organisations – which the government 
now has to reclaim. This same interviewee 
suggested that FAO functions as the Ministry of 
Agriculture, the United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP) as the Ministry of Planning, 
the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) as 
the Ministry of Health, and perhaps WFP as the 
Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs. “The UN 
Humanitarian Coordinator [rather than the 
Minister of Humanitarian Affairs] decides where 
all the resources go” (key informant 40, 2019). 
“The ultimate goal needs to be to rebuild 
institutions, so that aid would not go on forever. 
The Somali government needs to think about 
why they are doing the same thing over and 
over again, and also about the real motivations 
for Western governments’ actions in Somalia” 
(ibid.). 
This ongoing power of aid organisations, and 
the need to align policy to those of Western 
donors and aid agencies, is leading to some 
resentment. A number of government officers 
                                                   
16 Integrated Phase Classification, which is linked to FSNAU 
data and classifies areas into food secure, borderline, crisis, 
emergency, or famine.  
suggested that NGOs’ main concern was to 
maintain their own “business” but government 
seemed powerless to do anything about it. As 
one government advisor commented: “Aid has 
become a business. They need the IPC16 
emergency classification so that NGOs can 
continue to get funding. The humanitarian 
appeal at the moment is for 1.7 billion, but the 
government is saying: what are you talking 
about? The figures are exaggerated. We cannot 
continue business as usual. … International 
agencies are just manipulating the data” (key 
informant 39, 2019). The failure of UN 
organisations to recognise the efforts of the 
Somali government in responding to the 2017 
“drought” is another source of resentment: 
Somalia has recurrent droughts. In 2011, we lost 
250,000 people. Everyone was saying that should 
be the last time. In 2017, it hit a number of regions 
but the number of deaths were low. Mainly 
because of the quality of the response from the 
Somali community themselves. … We started at 
an early stage to develop a plan. Set up a national 
committee. We started fundraising nationally and 
internationally. We raised $4 million. … I was not 
happy with how this initiative of local and national 
authorities was ignored by the international 
community. Why was it not in the OCHA [Office for 
the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs] report? 
They always assume that assistance comes from 
outside. That is the kind of dilemma we are in. We 
face recurrent drought so we need to be prepared. 
People come [from outside] and do things 
according to their own preferences – there is a lot 
of mistrust. But outsiders should not do it alone – 
do it in partnership. Keep the money if you want, 
but we must work together. It should be 
participatory. This is the only way to build 
institutions (key informant 22, 2019). 
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Many government officers in federal ministries 
either have a background in aid themselves or 
left Somalia during the conflict, got educated 
(eg, in the UK or US), and since 2012 have come 
back to work as part of the new federal 
government. Although neither the group with a 
history in aid organisations nor the group that 
has recently returned has much power, the 
former can use their knowledge of the system 
to attract aid and attempt to facilitate or 
coordinate aid organisations. The latter have to 
start from scratch and have faced problems as 
soon as they attempt to address some of the 
persistent problems of manipulation or 
diversion of aid. 
Officers in the Ministries of Humanitarian 
Affairs and Planning in South West region 
commented that the government had little 
capacity to develop or implement policy on aid, 
but at the same time, that it is important to bring 
about change and prevent repeated relief 
operations. Some had a background in aid 
organisations, so through developing good 
relationships could develop a common strategy 
for the region (key informant 42, 2019). 
However, much of this is based on the goodwill 
of the NGOs, who can in most instances still 
insist on doing things their way. The quote at 
the start of this section is indicative of this – 
government officers are expected to participate 
but do not have much choice in what actually 
happens (key informants 61 and 62, 2019). One 
commented that many organisations’ resilience 
programmes were in fact just the same as 
short-term humanitarian response, and 
highlighted the need for longer-term 
development programmes. This same official 
in the Ministry of Planning said: “We only 
oversee, the power is with NGO staff and local 
authorities” (key informant 61, 2019). And a 
district commissioner said that: “NGOs and UN 
agencies have power because they will only 
come to us and tell us, ‘We want to do ABC and 
work in XY locations.’ If we push, they will tell us 
we are coordinating with other actors we can 
only work here” (key informant 62, 2019). Or a 
governor: “NGOs are also hiding behind the 
insecurity” (key informant 63, 2019). NGOs 
informed us that in some places, like Baidoa, 
there appear to be policies on aid or agriculture, 
but no capacity to implement, but in other 
places there is nothing: “in Bardera we have 
never seen anybody talking of policy in terms of 
aid delivery, production, and trade” (key 
informant 48, 2019). At the same time, 
government officers recognise that for 
agriculture, it is mostly Al-Shabaab policies that 
currently apply (key informant 61, 2019). In 
addition, as mentioned in earlier sections, 
government has little influence over food 
imports and exports as this too is controlled by 
business and by Al-Shabaab. This state of 
affairs is made worse by the fact that after 30 
years of war and no government, most people 
have no idea how government actually works 
(ibid.). It can also be argued that the confusing 
and rapidly changing policy environment is to 
the advantage of those who are benefiting from 
the status quo. 
The preceding paragraphs about attempts to 
formulate government policy, and the 
weakness of ministries compared to the aid 
community (showing the need for capacity 
building) can be seen as the government actors’ 
frontstage performance. Backstage, however, 
these actions and resentments can also be 
seen as wanting to reclaim authority and power 
and – most importantly – control over 
resources. The need to control resources to 
amass personal wealth as quickly as possible, 
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as well as the need for a political budget to 
maintain the support of relatives and the clan, 
remains important as long as no stable 
government or regulated economy exists. This 
appropriation of resources is part of a process 
of extraversion, which is the way in which 
groups or individuals employ their dependent 
relationship with the external world to 
appropriate resources and authority (Hagmann, 
2016: 10–11). We can see this in the actions of 
Somali elites, including the tactics of 
government officers described above. As 
Hagmann (2016: 25) argues, this is not just a 
financial or material process but also involves 
adopting the rhetoric and discourse of 
international actors. Adopting the discourse of 
resilience or of scaling up nutrition, or needing 
to build up the capacity of Somali institutions, 
may thus be as much about attracting 
resources as about agreement on the way 
forward. The same applies to the alignment of 
UN organisations to particular ministries. As 
Hagmann (2016: 55) and one of our key 
informants argued, as long as the 4.5 formula 
of clan representation is part of Somalia’s 
system of power sharing and state-building, 
clan will also be appropriated by elites as a way 
of attracting resources and increasing their 
bargaining power. In such circumstances it will 
be difficult for any government officer to put 
policy implementation above the need to 
maintain clan loyalty and support. The latter 
requires a political budget which involves 
extraversion by various means.17 
Long-term aid workers, traders, and 
transporters seemed to confirm this ongoing 
backstage priority of government officers for 
                                                   
17 Hagmann (2016) describes these as coercion, trickery, 
flight, intermediation, appropriation, and rejection, and 
covers each in detail in Stabilisation, Extraversion, and 
political patronage and budgets. For example, 
one long-term aid worker suggested that the 
government exaggerated the extent of drought 
to increase the aid coming in (key informant 38, 
2019). Another that the government will accept 
any form of aid but is not able to provide 
security for farmers or aid workers (key 
informant 46, 2019). While federal government 
advisors and officials talked about their goals of 
Somali institutions that had the capacity to 
develop and implement policy, others talked 
about corruption and numerous demands for 
taxes, fees, and bribes. As one businessman 
commented: “At federal level and within each 
region, they just say, ‘Give me the money.’ But 
you get no services in return. The figures and 
amounts have changed but you have to give the 
money. With decentralisation, there is parallel 
taxation at different levels. … There is no justice 
system. Nowhere to take grievance or court 
system. If you have a problem in Mogadishu – 
for example someone says they are going to 
build in front of your door – you have to go to 
Al-Shabaab. If you go to government, you will 
just end up paying a lot of money.” The UN 
Monitoring Group reports government 
diversion of aid, sometimes in collusion with aid 
organisations or gatekeepers of IDP camps, at 
every level every year. 
Transport and trading businesses had 
complaints about government and militia taxes 
at checkpoints: “From Mogadishu to Baidoa 
there are very many road blocks most of them 
by the government. A 30-tonne truck from 
Bakara market to Baidoa market will cost US$ 
4,300” (key informant 50, 2019). Others 
reported the same problem and that 
Political Settlements in Somalia, (Rift Valley Institute, London 
and Nairobi).  
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government taxation is difficult to deal with 
because it is disorganised and uncoordinated 
(eg, key informants 51, 52, and 53, 2019). Again, 
they felt they received little in return in terms of 
security or an improved business environment. 
There is no quality or price control by the 
government. Or, as one businessman 
commented: “What kind of government are you 
talking about, they know nothing, the majority of 
them are young men and women who have 
never seen what Somalia used to produce” (key 
informant 59, 2019). 
Only a few businesspeople or aid workers were 
positive about the efforts of the current 
government to provide a secure environment 
for business. For example, one said: “They are 
after politicians who have active contracts. For 
example, Sky-link Arabia (SKA) is an 
international company that manages the 
seaport and is protected by politicians, who 
receive money through this contract. The 
government wants to cut this. But people with 
money have to involve themselves in politics to 
protect their business. If you have a contract, 
you have to be connected” (key informant 37, 
2019). Another commented on how the 
government is trying to regulate banks and to 
create an environment in which the rule of law 
works (key informant 33, 2019) but at the same 
time that following government rules can pose 
risks from Al-Shabaab (key informant 60, 2019). 
One of the Nairobi-based transporters also 
reported receiving a lot of support in expanding 
into fishing and providing support for private 
sector (key informant 28, 2019).18 
                                                   
18 Note that the opinion of businesspeople of government 
policy and support is likely to be influenced by clan. That is, 
Key role of the District Commissioner 
While federal and member state ministries may 
have little control officially over aid (but 
unofficially divert and take bribes) there is no 
doubt that local authorities, in particular the 
district commissioners, have a key role in how 
aid is allocated, and they can boost their 
political authority by doing so. This varies by 
location: in some the DC is all powerful (eg, 
North Gedo), in some he is influential (Baidoa), 
and in others the NGOs are far more powerful 
(Belet Weyn). As mentioned in Section 5, the 
power of selecting beneficiaries and the 
retailers redeeming food vouchers now lies 
mainly with the DCs, NGOs, and camp owners 
(in the case of beneficiaries), as demonstrated 
by the quotes below: 
Access to aid is through the local authority and 
NGOs. The main changes include NGOs work 
closely with local authorities which was not there 
in 2006 when we arrived here (key informant 65, 
2019). 
Local authority, NGO staff, and gatekeepers 
control aid, most of the time they all collude, even 
myself I have pay kickbacks. How do you think I 
got the vendor contract and put shops in the IDP 
camps? (key informant 54, 2019). 
The DC in Baidoa himself said, “Whenever there 
is new registration of beneficiaries by any NGO 
we get pressure from friends, relatives, and clan 
members for inclusion. If we don’t, they turn 
against you. This is a problem” (key informant 
62, 2019). And an official from the Ministry of 
Planning noted that he was unable to address 
the problem: “I have no doubt those involved in 
targeting at different levels will target their 
those interviewed from the Marehan clan might be treated 
more favourably by the current President.  
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friends and clans to buy their political loyalties 
and remain in office. We get these complaints a 
lot but I am sorry we can do very little about 
that. We only oversee, the power is with NGO 
staff and local authorities” (key informant 61, 
2019). 
That power, or political loyalty, is gained from 
selecting aid beneficiaries from one’s own clan 
and through taxation or diversion of aid is 
nothing new. As with food aid, clan affiliation 
influences selection for cash transfers, and 
local administration may charge an 
administrative fee for every voucher (key 
informant 25, 2019) or allocate vouchers or SIM 
cards to themselves for the same purpose. 
However, the focus of food assistance in a few 
key towns has led some DCs to become very 
powerful. As before, controlling aid means 
gaining power. “If someone is looking for 
political power, he will first go to the UN offices. 
In terms of aid contracts, Baidoa is an 
important labour market because of the large 
concentration of IDPs. These aid contracts are 
controlled by the most powerful clans, working 
within few organisations and local authorities, 
with of course the DC at its head” (key 
informant 51, 2019). Another good example of 
the power of the DC can be found in Dollo 
(Gedo), which again presents a concentration 
of large amounts of aid within a much smaller 
area. Limited access to Al-Shabaab areas 
means all UN organisations and NGOs are 
concentrated in the small government-held 
area around Dollo – about 40 square 
kilometres. It has made the DC into one of the 
most powerful people in Somalia (key 
informants 4 and 26, 2019). Abdirashid, the DC 
in Dollo, has been accused of manipulating 
humanitarian operations through contracting 
cartels and the imposition of inappropriate 
bureaucratic impediments to control and 
extract financial benefit from humanitarian 
operations (UN Security Council, 2016). 
To conclude, government ministers and senior 
officials in the FGS are in a weak position 
compared to business and are mainly 
concerned with their own individual political 
fortunes. By extension, they are concerned with 
the functioning of their ministries insofar as 
those serve as a means of patronage and 
political leverage – and occasionally as an 
instrument of social policy. At the local level, the 
concentration of aid in urban areas has hugely 
increased the power of the DC and his ability to 
maintain the political loyalty of his clan and to 
buy the loyalty of his enemies. With aid being 
mostly distributed in government areas, it could 
be argued that international aid is a tool to prop 
up the government in areas newly captured 
from Al-Shabaab. It could also be seen as part 
of the donor stabilisation agenda, which aims to 
strengthen the FGS (Hagmann, 2016). Some 
informants commented that if aid and 
international organisations move out of the 
towns, Al-Shabaab would move in immediately 
(key informants 26 and 29, 2019). This raises a 
number of questions around the international 
geopolitics of aid and the maintenance of crisis 
and IDP concentrations in Somalia. These 
issues are discussed further in the next section. 
7. Marginalisation and 
displacement. Who benefits? 
IDPS are used as a human commodity. I think they 
were forcibly displaced, then taken advantage of 
in towns, then [formed to create] a cheap labour 
force (key informant 44, 2019). 
The previous sections have shown that the 
marginalization of certain groups or clans 
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continues and that most of the displaced in 
Baidoa, Mogadishu, and Kismayo consist of 
marginalized or minority clans (ie, Bantu and 
different Rahanweyn clans). Furthermore, 
concentrations of IDPs in towns have increased 
in recent years. Their exploitation in 
displacement varies, from having to pay part of 
the aid they receive to gatekeepers or 
landowners, to being expelled when the land 
they live on becomes too valuable. Clearly, 
some people are benefiting and maintaining 
their power from continued displacement, 
ranging from camp gatekeepers or landowners, 
to local authorities, aid agencies and 
businesses.  Aid agencies and businesses 
benefit from provide food (aid), and businesses 
also from providing services for the 
humanitarian community (security, meeting 
venues) and from cheap labour to produce cash 
crops (often involving the same businessmen 
contracted to provide aid). Displaced 
populations and aid assists the government as 
they strengthen its hold on towns in south-
central Somalia, as aid and international 
organizations are concentrated there. As such, 
food assistance can also be seen as part of a 
counter-insurgency measure in that it removes 
the Al-Shabaab support base from the rural 
areas it controls, and Al-Shabaab can be seen 
as necessary for the aid apparatus to remain. It 
appears therefore, that the displaced have 
become a key part of the political economy of 
food in Somalia. This section discusses each of 
these issues in turn. 
Persistent marginalisation and 
protracted displacement 
Aid workers, IDPs and their representatives, and 
businesspeople all talked about the persistent 
marginalization of particular groups. They 
mentioned both long-term structural 
marginalization of people in Bay and Bakool 
and along the rivers, and their more immediate 
vulnerability. Populations like the Rahanweyn 
and Bantu are more vulnerable to drought and 
other hazards because they have fewer 
connections within the diaspora, they have 
been subjected to several land seizures, and for 
those who were not yet landless the shift to 
cash crops made them more vulnerable, turned 
them into more exploitable labour, and 
ultimately resulted in forced displacement. 
“They have no space, no resources, and no 
policies to represent them. This leads to 
displacement, where they are either excluded 
from assistance or exploited” (key informant 20, 
2019). There are few businesspeople from 
minority clans and they are rarely represented 
in local administration. “Their voice doesn’t 
make any difference, they are used for 
attracting aid and excluded it when it comes” 
(key informant 49, 2019). Their exclusion from 
aid was a common theme in our interviews, 
including with businesspeople, who might say, 
“Many people are just in the camps and not 
receiving anything, they are excluded by 
gatekeepers, NGOs staff, and local authority 
officials” (key informant 54, 2019). This was 
repeated by all IDPs interviewed for this study, 
as demonstrated by the following quote: 
Our clans are a minority in Baidoa and while other 
IDP camps get aid we rarely get aid. We only get 
some NFIs [non-food items] but no food aid or 
cash. We depend on daily labour in Baidoa city … 
we don’t have representation in the local 
authorities and our voice is not heard. Yes we 
always go to the offices and shout but they don’t 
care … Aid beneficiaries in Baidoa are few majority 
clans ... Those who are represented in the local 
authority and NGO staff. … The aid system in 
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Baidoa is corrupt, if you are not in the circle of 
local authority and gatekeepers, then you get 
nothing or less (key informant 66, 2019). 
Others said that minorities have little say and if 
they complain they are chased away (key 
informant 67, 2019). Abuse of IDPs who 
complained has also been reported by Human 
Rights Watch (Human Rights Watch, 2013). In 
Mogadishu, displaced people often talked 
about being at the mercy of landowners or 
gatekeepers and having to accept their 
conditions, meaning they have to pay a 
percentage of the aid they receive to stay in the 
camp. As discussed in previous sections, the 
exclusion of certain clans from food distribution 
has been common since the 1990s (see for 
example Jaspars, 2000). The phenomenon of 
gatekeepers appears to have been considered 
as something new in the 2011 famine (Bryld et 
al., 2013). 
It is telling that ongoing marginalization is not 
acknowledged in the National Development 
Plan or by some of the government officers we 
interviewed; for example a government advisor 
in Mogadishu commented: “People being 
marginalised was a conflict issue. I have not 
seen anything on this now” (key informant 40, 
2019). Or from district authorities in Baidoa: “I 
am the only leader who always looks for the 
marginalized communities when there are 
beneficiary registrations and force NGOs to 
make sure they register them, so that claim 
[that some clans are persistently marginalised] 
is not right” (key informant 62, 2019). And: 
“Marginalized communities are part of the 
communities in the region and they are served 
and benefiting from aid even more than others 
                                                   
19 Although one informant said the pull factor was less with 
cash than with food aid. 
because of affirmative action policies. I don’t 
think there are people or communities which 
are deliberately excluded from aid but it is 
possible that people who don’t meet the NGO 
selection criteria complain (key informant 63, 
2019). Similar claims were made by regional 
authorities in Benadir (key informant 64, 2019). 
In addition, in the opinion of one former 
government official, “the government 
representatives for middle and lower Shebelle 
and for lower Juba cannot actually go there, 
and you never see them with IDPs from those 
areas. They are part of the problem – they are 
collaborating with the people that are 
profiteering”. 
Most of the displaced are from minority or 
historically marginalised groups (Rahanweyn 
clans and Bantu mostly) (see for example 
Human Rights Watch, 2013). This was the case 
in 2011, and again in 2017, when the number of 
IDPs increased dramatically. The number of 
displaced more than doubled in 2017 – from 1 
million to 2 million – and by January 2018 the 
total was 2.6 million (UN OCHA, 2018). 
According to OCHA (2018), the reasons are 
conflict, drought, lack of livelihood 
opportunities, and evictions (see below). From 
the previous sections, other reasons include 
issues such as loss of land or Al-Shabaab 
taxations, but many informants also claimed 
that food assistance was one of the reasons for 
migration, and the creation of IDP camps for 
business purposes was another. The 
modalities of cash transfers may be partly why 
they contribute to displacement,19 as well as the 
fact that WFP – one of the main organisations 
provided cash transfers (including vouchers) – 
is not able to work in Al-Shabaab areas. Aid 
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workers and businesspeople widely considered 
aid a pull factor (eg, key informants 24, 41, 46, 
50, and 52, 2019). 
People are migrating to towns, because of aid and 
because of Al-Shabaab. … 1 million IDPs arrived in 
Mogadishu. Who attracts them? Humanitarian 
organisations, who then have to distribute food 
aid because there are no jobs. Who is benefiting? 
NGOs? Instead of distributing food aid, [they] need 
to come up with something different. 
Resettlement? Big brokers benefit the most (key 
informant 41, 2019). 
One aid worker suggested that the WFP’s 
SCOPE system could hinder people’s ability to 
return home.  For example, in Baidoa, because 
the food vouchers can only be redeemed at 
food shops in Baidoa town, which needs a 
thumb print so IDPs stay in town. This again 
affected the appropriation of land by others 
(key informant 19, 2019). This impact of aid 
modalities themselves in keeping people in 
towns needs further exploration. Many IDPs, as 
we have already seen, sold their land before 
coming to Mogadishu or Baidoa, which means 
they are unable to go back. This trend is 
confirmed by a recent study by the EU Trust 
Fund’s Research and Evidence Facility (REF) 
(2018) which found that half the displaced in 
urban areas (including Mogadishu, Kismayo, 
and Baidoa) intended to stay. 
Who benefits from concentrations of 
IDPs and aid in government areas? 
It is not just aid organisations that benefit from 
maintaining large concentrations of IDPs in 
towns for a long time. Several layers of people, 
businesses, and governments authorities all 
benefit. This sub-section discusses the evolving 
role of gatekeepers and how IDPs have become 
a business opportunity for landowners and 
“entrepreneurs” (or gatekeepers). There are 
economic benefits to be gained from attracting 
IDPs to town as this attracts aid and increases 
the value of land on which IDPs are settled. 
Business also benefits from cheap labour and 
local government from acting as an 
intermediary. 
All IDPs interviewed in Mogadishu reported 
having to pay part of the aid they received to 
gatekeepers. They said they handed over 30 per 
cent of the aid they received – and that if they 
did not pay, they would not be allowed to stay in 
the camp. This corresponds to the figures 
reported by other researchers (see for example 
Mumin, 2018). Those we spoke to did not report 
looting of aid – presumably because this is 
more difficult with cash. The gatekeepers are 
therefore the most obvious people who benefit. 
Landowners often rent land to entrepreneurs 
who initiate camp settlements, and these 
middlemen are usually referred to by aid 
workers as “gatekeepers”. Among aid workers, 
opinions about gatekeepers vary: some see 
them as abusers and exploiters of IDPs 
because they use IDPs as a source of income, 
whereas others see them as charging 
legitimate rent for their (or someone else’s) 
land, or for spending time meeting with NGOs 
and UN organisations to attract aid. One aid 
worker, for example, suggested that the “issue 
of gatekeepers is small compared to other 
issues,” saying they are community volunteers. 
“Someone has a piece of land and receives 
IDPs. The land needs to be protected, as there 
is no police, no government. Health, education, 
other services need to be provided” (key 
informant 37, 2019). Many aid organisations 
see gatekeepers as the necessary interface 
between IDPs and the aid community – 
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because IDP numbers are large, government is 
absent for long periods, and aid organisations 
are not able to access camp settlements 
directly – with expectations that they can be 
reformed through training (see also 
McCullough and Saed, 2017). According to 
Bakonyi et al. (2019), IDPs were mostly positive 
about camp leaders (or gatekeepers) because 
of their efforts to provide services. 
Even if gatekeepers are “just charging rent”, 
however, clearly having an IDP camp is 
considered a business, which may also involve 
actively attracting IDPs to Mogadishu. This may 
be partly why gatekeepers and IDPs increased 
between 2011 and 2017: 
I have interviewed people who have been driven to 
Mogadishu and outskirts with promise of food, 
money, health care. This is same everywhere. 
Gatekeepers are the workers of the powerful 
[politicians and business people]. If you try to do 
anything you will be blocked by local 
administration. I got into a serious situation 
myself with local government by interviewing 
gatekeepers (key informant 44, 2019). 
I saw a huge increase in gatekeepers from 2011 
to 2017 [in Mogadishu]. They were picking people 
up in buses. It became an industry – a link with 
informal settlements. It needs to be seen as part 
of urban economy. We need improvements in 
governance, in security, and PPP [public-private 
partnerships] for services (key informant 36, 
2019). 
Gatekeeper-ship itself can be bought or sold 
(Human Rights Watch, 2013). The money to be 
made from IDPs also makes gatekeepers 
reluctant to let people go back to their areas of 
origin (key informant 20, 2019), thus 
contributing to protracted displacement. 
Gatekeepers and owners of the land on which 
IDPs live also benefit from the increase in value 
of the land, particularly in Mogadishu, as it 
acquires access to new services such as water 
and health care (Bakonyi et al., 2019; key 
informant 37). One informant commented that 
if a piece of land was $100,000 before, now it is 
worth perhaps $2 million (key informant 20, 
2019). The price of land has escalated 
dramatically from 2012 onwards, with diaspora 
and business investment as well as a greater 
presence of the international community in 
Mogadishu (Rift Valley Institute and Heritage 
Institute for Policy Studies, 2017). IDPs are 
therefore frequently evicted. UN OCHA reported 
729,000 evictions between 2015 and 2018 (UN 
OCHA, 2018). In most cases, this means 
moving farther out to, the periphery of the city, 
obviously with fewer facilities and services to 
start over with (UN Protection Cluster, 2016). 
For the more recently displaced, exploitation 
appears to be higher, indicating that the notion 
of IDPs as a business opportunity is increasing 
(Mumin, 2018), with aid workers having little 
scope for resisting, given the number of 
interests involved: 
When they are evicted, someone will make 
money. A long-term solution requires access to 
land or ownership. When people are evicted, their 
shelter is destroyed, and they have to start over. 
This means aid people come, and new services. I 
have tried advocacy with the Benadir government 
to come up with an IDP policy which includes 
giving land. But the government is not willing. 
They are under pressure from the business people 
(key informant 37, 2019). 
Businesses also benefit – whether because 
they supply aid, food, or other services, or 
because of the cheap labour that IDPs offer. 
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The Gabaweyn in Dollo and Luuq, for example, 
work mainly as labourers on farms or as porters 
in town (key informant 4, 2019). Also, “without 
them [the IDPs], there would be no business. 
The more displacement, the more business” 
(key informant 37, 2019). Even businesspeople 
themselves admitted this: “increased IDPs into 
the main cities is good business for us, but it is 
not good for the country” (key informant 55, 
2019). And of course, if business benefits, 
government benefits. The previous sections 
(and the quote above) highlights the close 
connections between local authorities, aid 
agencies, and businesses (eg, retailers) in the 
control of aid. Gatekeepers connected to NGOs 
and the local authorities are able to attract more 
aid for their client and are able to attract more 
IDPs. Section 6 showed how this has made the 
district commissioners particularly powerful. 
Without such a concentration of IDPs and aid 
organisations in urban areas, it is questionable 
whether DCs would have become quite as 
powerful as they are now. These ways of 
turning IDPs into a business, and the links 
between gatekeepers and local authorities, 
were reported for people displaced in the 2011 
famine (Human Rights Watch, 2013) and 
appear to have increased with the increased 
numbers of IDPs from 2017 onwards. As a 
former senior TFG official told Human Rights 
Watch, “The IDPs don’t get humanitarian 
assistance directly, but through district 
commissioners, militias and gatekeepers: this 
is the biggest business in Mogadishu” (Human 
Rights Watch, 2013: 22). 
At a higher level, aid to IDPs helps maintain the 
government’s hold on urban areas in south-
central Somalia. One informant questioned 
whether the government would be able to hold 
onto towns surrounded by Al-Shabaab without 
it. By extension, this means that for Western 
governments, aid to government-held towns 
can also be seen as part of a counter-terrorism 
measure. It maintains an AMISOM and SNA 
presence in towns which would otherwise not 
be possible. At the same time, Al-Shabaab’s 
presence in rural areas is keeping the whole aid-
business-political power apparatus going. The 
business angle can also be taken to a higher 
level. Without large numbers of aid 
organisations, who are there because of the 
ongoing large numbers of displaced, there 
would be no need for the extended green zone 
at Mogadishu airport or services to meet the 
needs of aid organisations.  This includes 
security arrangements, accommodation, 
restaurants, meeting facilities, and fuel for their 
vehicles, much of which is of course provided 
by businessmen who made their money 
working as WFP contractors (and who have 
close links with both former and current Somali 
Presidents). 
For many actors in Somalia (national and 
international), there is a need to maintain the aid 
flow in government areas, for political and 
economic purposes, and this also means it is 
necessary to maintain large groups of 
vulnerable people in towns. This in turn needs 
Al-Shabaab in rural areas. Government, militia, 
and businesspeople (including gatekeepers, 
food retailers, traders, and transporters, and to 
some extent money-transfer companies) all 
have an interest in maintaining the status quo. 
While the status quo may not be the result of 
the deliberate intentions of a combined 
government-Al-Shabaab-business-Western 
government strategy, maintaining it appears to 
conveniently be in all of their political and 
economic interests.  It is clearly not in the 
interest of the displaced or marginalised. 
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Similar conclusions have been reached by other 
researchers. Menkhaus (2014) for example, 
suggests that powerful vested interests from 
the business community could explain the 
protracted state failure. It is in their interest to 
have no regulation or state taxation. 
Gatekeepers, corrupt government officials, and 
even aid organisations also benefit from an 
accountability-free zone (Menkhaus, 2014). 
Harper (2019) finds that the private security and 
peace-keeping industry needs Al-Shabaab for 
its continued existence. This study adds to their 
analysis by arguing that governments, 
businessmen, and aid organisations benefit 
from the continuing large numbers of displaced 
in urban areas. The displaced have become a 
key part of the political economy of food in 
Somalia. Large concentrations of displaced in 
urban areas helps maintain the power of 
businesses, aid organisations, and government 
intermediaries. They are dependent on a steady 
pool of poor, vulnerable, or exploitable 
populations. 
8. Conclusions 
Somalia has gone from being a political arena 
dominated by unregulated market forces in the 
absence of a state to being a nominal state in 
some areas but one where business and clan 
interests remain far more powerful. Food 
assistance, production, and trade continue to 
play key roles in who has power and who does 
not. Extreme inequality remains, and existing 
governance and food assistance systems feed 
into this. New regimes of aid practices not only 
appear to accept that large numbers of people 
will remain in a situation of permanent crisis or 
precarity, but hide the politics and conflict that 
cause it. 
The political economy of food in Somalia in the 
past 15 years presents both change and 
continuity with earlier years. Food assistance 
and governance systems have changed; these 
include the change from food aid to cash 
transfers, the rise of Al-Shabaab, and the 
establishment of the Federal Government of 
Somalia. This has led to changes in practices 
and an increase in the number of actors 
involved – including business and government 
authorities – as well as both a diffusion of and 
a shift in power. With the shift to cash transfers 
and vouchers, more and new smaller traders 
have become involved and benefited from food-
aid logistics. At the same time, however, control 
over food resources remains within the hands 
of a business and political elite (mostly from 
Somalia’s dominant clans), and groups like the 
Rahanweyn and minorities continue to be 
marginalised and are increasingly displaced. 
Small traders and retailers remain dependent 
on a few large food traders and importers for 
their supply. Former food-aid contractors 
continue to exert power over trade and 
transport because of their control of fuel supply 
(petroleum). They are also involved in food 
imports and continue to benefit from aid 
because of the security and accommodation 
they provide to the international community. 
Telecoms companies, in particular Hormuud, 
have become some of the most powerful 
actors in Somalia, in part supported by the aid 
community’s shift to cash transfers. Hormuud 
may well be the most powerful player in 
Somalia, not only because it controls money 
transfers but also because it invests in every 
profitable sector, from food imports to cash 
crop production to construction. Al-Shabaab 
indirectly feeds into the power of big business, 
by prohibiting food aid (and other humanitarian 
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assistance) in areas it controls and imposing a 
number of taxes on production and transport, 
thus forcing displacement to urban areas 
(controlled by the government). Food aid and 
cash transfers both continue to provide political 
and economic benefits through diversion, 
taxation, and manipulation of aid. 
The increase in cash crop production has 
further concentrated power and increased the 
vulnerability of marginalised and minority 
groups. Big companies, including money-
transfer organisations and companies or 
individuals previously involved in food aid, are 
also investing in commercial cash crop 
production, in particular lemon and banana. 
This process has involved the sale of land and 
the displacement of already marginalised 
groups. Under the current circumstances, 
businesses in Somalia essentially engage in 
whatever is most profitable rather than 
specialising in particular commodities. So, for 
example, a large contractor may work in food-
aid transport when this is most profitable but 
switch to construction or petroleum when this 
becomes where most profit is to be made. Or a 
telecoms company may purchase land or 
invest in sesame production when the demand 
is there. This changes as soon as the business 
environment or global or local demand 
changes. For this it needs a flexible and 
exploitable reserve of labour – which is 
supplied by the ever-larger number of displaced 
populations. Even the displaced themselves 
have become a business opportunity, as they 
can be used to attract (and divert) aid and to 
improve the value of land. Government’s 
inability to enforce regulations – whether on 
aid, labour relations, or land rights – further 
enables the ongoing exploitation of labour (in 
particular historically marginalised or minority 
groups) and the forced acquisition of land with 
impunity. 
Food aid and cash transfers have also been and 
remain part of the political marketplace. The 
intersection between the commodification of 
food aid and the commodification of politics 
has changed over time. Large companies or 
businessmen initially gained wealth and power 
through transport contracts and diversion and 
used this to buy political status and influence. 
The change to cash transfers brought about a 
more dispersed marketplace for buying political 
loyalty, which in particular boosted the power of 
local authorities (such as district 
commissioners). The rise of the money-transfer 
agencies, in particular Hormuud, indicates a 
modification of the political marketplace: rather 
than buying political power or influence, the aim 
appears to be buying political compliance (or 
protection) so that their business empires can 
continue to grow. The power and political 
patronage of trading and money-transfer 
companies is further boosted by investing in 
cash crop production (and a range of other 
profitable ventures). Al-Shabaab enters the 
political marketplace indirectly because by 
effectively facilitating displacement, it re-
enforces the food assistance-business 
connection. Business, in turn, sustains Al-
Shabaab through taxes on imports, trade, and 
production. 
The federal government is no doubt the weaker 
partner in any negotiations involving the 
international community or with business. 
Government ministries involved in food or 
humanitarian assistance work closely with 
Western donors and international organisations 
(including the UN) to formulate policy. The 
close alignment with donors’ priorities can also 
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be seen as attempts to attract and appropriate 
resources to establish and maintain a political 
budget (an example of extraversion discussed 
by Hagmann, 2016). As long as the Somali 
political system is centred around clan identity, 
politicians and ministers will need to have 
resources to buy the political loyalties, including 
of their clan, to ensure their survival. Bribes and 
informal taxation are part of establishing this 
political budget. While federal government 
ministries are weak and need to constantly 
appropriate resources, Al-Shabaab is 
undoubtedly a political and economic rival to 
the government. It controls much of Somalia’s 
most productive areas (and arguably 
agricultural policies), food movement out of 
these areas, and more importantly, it is able to 
tax food imports to Mogadishu – highlighting 
the control it has at this level (ie, it is 
presumably able to stop imports too). 
Regimes of food-aid practices are also about 
assessments, targeting, monitoring, and the 
technologies, institutions, and science involved. 
An analysis of changes in these regimes’ 
practices shows that rather than highlighting 
issues of food and power (including the 
ongoing manipulation of food assistance), 
current aid practices not only fail to address 
issues of collusion and diversion but – more 
importantly – they make the structural causes 
of food insecurity and malnutrition invisible. By 
focussing on nutrition and behaviour change, 
and individual actions to improve food security 
and resilience, the focus has shifted towards 
individual responsibility instead. In the current 
aid regime, malnutrition is attributed to a large 
extent to poor feeding and hygiene behaviours. 
This exacerbates the discrimination of 
marginalised and minority groups in which the 
highest levels of malnutrition and mortality are 
found. Furthermore, with a shift in language – 
from aid organisations and beneficiaries to 
business and client satisfaction – principles 
and ethics and meeting the needs of vulnerable 
populations no longer comes across as 
important (see also Scott-Smith, 2016). 
Aid workers and government officials seem to 
constantly be working with two realities at the 
same time. One is the official reality where aid 
is distributed efficiently using new technologies 
(cash transfers, new quantitative indicators, 
electronic or digital systems) and where people 
can be made resilient. The other reality is one 
where politics and power are prominent, where 
the distribution of resources is determined by 
kin and other alliances, and the most vulnerable 
are marginalised or excluded. This is similar to 
the politics of aid in Ethiopia described as 
frontstage and backstage in the humanitarian 
literature by Desportes et al., (2019). Whereas 
Desportes et al. (2019) suggest that the 
backstage reveals the decision-making 
monopoly of the state and the role of conflict 
dynamics in humanitarian response, in Somalia 
it reveals the power of business, the collusion to 
divert aid, and the ongoing marginalisation of 
particular ethnic groups. As in Ethiopia, there 
appears to be limited room for manoeuvre for 
backstage knowledge to influence the 
frontstage performance. Aid organisations 
display a degree of self-censorship to maintain 
their frontstage performance and to keep their 
reputation and funding going. Government 
ministries in Somalia also operate front and 
backstage, with frontstage being working 
together with international actors to formulate 
policy and backstage the need to attract 
external funds to maintain systems of political 
patronage. In Somalia, powerful incentives keep 
the front and backstage separate as this keeps 
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the aid operation going. At the same time, 
however, this means that inequalities in the 
distribution of land, production, and aid and the 
use of food assistance to gain political and 
economic power continues. The causes of 
malnutrition and food insecurity are not 
addressed. 
Aid organisations, government, Al-Shabaab, 
and business all benefit from maintaining the 
status quo (and thus the frontstage 
performance) but this state of affairs leads to 
an international operation in Somalia which is 
no longer about humanitarian assistance. This 
status quo involves maintaining large numbers 
of displaced populations in urban areas, whose 
land can be used for commercial cash crop 
production, who can be used to attract aid and 
increase the value of land, or who become a 
flexible and exploitable labour force. Keeping 
aid going also maintains business, whether 
food trade or money transfer. Furthermore, the 
concentration of aid in urban areas also 
benefits government as it not only boosts the 
power of local authorities but can also be seen 
as a form of counter-insurgency as it attracts 
people out of Al-Shabaab areas and re-enforces 
the government’s hold on towns. On the other 
hand, some of the economic benefits depend 
on sustaining Al-Shabaab’s presence in rural 
areas. 
The aid communities’ seeming acceptance of 
permanent displacement and precarity (except 
for trying to make the displaced more resilient) 
can also be seen to reflect a global trend.  The 
condition of the displaced seems to be 
emblematic of the techno-barbaric future that 
Duffield (2019a) writes about in post-
humanitarianism. A future in which life is 
maintained only in its most basic sense through 
new technologies that help people survive and 
adapt to permanent crisis, including through 
information to alter behaviour, but in which 
people have no need for infrastructure or public 
services and no hope of an increase in material 
well-being or social mobility. Bakonyi et al. 
(2019) already write about this in relation to 
Somalia: “Urban camps in Somalia are globally 
governed formations of precarity. They may be 
located on the edge of the world, but they 
remain part of it and are shaped by its socio-
political logics and the multiple agencies that 
contribute to their emergence.” Duffield (2019b) 
later adds to his analysis by highlighting the 
similarity between the digitisation of welfare in 
the West and of humanitarian assistance in the 
global South and argues that this practice leads 
to making poverty and conflict and crisis 
disappear respectively. The poor and 
marginalised in Somalia are not alone in the 
problems they face but are part of the global 
rise in precarity. 
So, what to do about food, power, and aid in 
Somalia? Both the political system and the 
humanitarian system are broken, and the two 
have been intimately linked. The chances are 
that, as long as the situation remains unstable 
and until the political system becomes more 
inclusive, anyone who can will attempt to make 
a quick profit or appropriate funds or assets as 
a source of political patronage for their kin and 
allies. Until these political issues can be 
addressed, which includes talking to Al-
Shabaab, there are a limited number of actions 
for the immediate and medium term. 
The first immediate or medium-term action is a 
need to determine whether the actions of 
business in Somalia are actually illegal and, if 
not, whether they are illegitimate or immoral. 
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The kinds of actions to be considered would be 
not only the manipulation or diversion of aid, but 
also coercion to purchase productive land, or 
the exploitation of displaced populations as a 
business opportunity. If no laws prohibit this in 
Somalia, the next step would be to consider 
international human rights or humanitarian law, 
although at the same time, we already know 
that humanitarian principles have been 
regularly violated in Somalia. The best option, in 
the short term, may be to consider whether 
practices are considered immoral or illegitimate 
in Somali traditional law or culture. How are 
civic values such solidarity, inclusion, 
protection, and resisting threats part of Somali 
society, and what are the examples of cross-
clan mutuality? Rather than focussing on 
resilience, and NGO ideas of civil society, the 
need is to look at how Somali civil society and 
traditional or customary law promote such 
values. On the basis of this, it may also be 
possible to promote cross-clan social work by 
big business. 
Second, donors need to provide incentives for 
aid organisations and the government to be 
open about what happens and what is known 
backstage in the humanitarian theatre. Rather 
than rewarding aid organisations and the 
government for adopting the rhetoric of 
resilience, scaling up nutrition, or other aid 
buzzwords, they should be rewarded for 
analysing and reporting the actual problems 
facing populations in Somalia, such as how 
power is maintained, the ongoing diversion of 
aid, and the wider political and economic 
effects of their interventions. The frontstage of 
technical innovation, efficiency, and progress 
needs to be modified with backstage reality. Aid 
practices need be explicit about the impact of 
politics and conflict, rather than making it 
invisible. 
Third, changes are necessary in information 
and monitoring systems to allow for the 
political dimension to come through. At a 
minimum, an understanding of the process of 
how some people become food insecure and 
malnourished requires an understanding of 
production beyond estimates of yields and 
wages for casual labour. It requires 
understanding how commercial crop 
production works and the labour relations that 
this involves. It also means acknowledging the 
importance of social networks and political 
connections in nutrition and food security. 
Without these elements, information systems 
will likely be exploited and abused just like all 
other aspects of the aid programme. 
Finally, humanitarian organisations need to 
take a long and hard look at what they are 
actually doing in Somalia. The extraordinary 
thing about Somalia is that everyone (including 
aid actors) has known about the diversion and 
manipulation of aid – including the collusion 
between government authorities, militia, aid 
organisations, and business to divert aid – for 
at least 20 or 30 years. After 30 years, lessons 
learnt about social and political marginalisation 
have been re-learned but there is still no 
operational capability to incorporate them. At 
the same time, targeting the most vulnerable is 
clearly not possible without an understanding 
of power. There are bigger questions, however: 
How is using the language of business – and 
remote management – affecting their 
relationship with crisis-affected populations? 
How can the solution to a crisis caused by 
violence and unregulated free market (both 
economic and political), and which creates 
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large numbers of malnourished and displaced 
populations, be to promote business and 
private sector intervention in every aspect of 
aid? And also: Is it really acceptable to work with 
gatekeepers or other intermediaries who 
benefit from the displaced? What are resilience 
interventions actually doing, other than 
encouraging adaptation to a life of permanent 
precarity and crisis? And, as Duffield (2019b) 
suggests, does this make aid organisations and 
government complicit in the return of slavery as 
part of the development of a business and 
plantation economy? 
This report has highlighted a number of areas 
of grave concern. Most aid is not meeting 
humanitarian aims. Both traditional and new 
humanitarian approaches are inadequate for 
analysing and addressing Somalia’s protracted 
crisis. Putting this right is going to take time and 
will be difficult, requiring discussion, debate, 
and reflection between all actors concerned. 
There are also be areas which need further 
research, for example the relationship between 
Al-Shabaab and business in cash-crop 
production (and its exploitative effects), the 
extent of land sales and therefore the 
permanence of displacement, the role of the 
displaced in Somalia’s political economy, and 
the control of the food supply between Al-
Shabaab, business, and government. Despite 
the severe challenges this report raises, we 
hope it can assist in finding a way forward to 
meeting the needs and aspirations of Somalia’s 
most vulnerable and marginalised groups. 
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Annex 1: Research questions 
1. How has production and trade (food) changed with changes in conflict/governance? 
o Who is involved, and what is their role? How has it changed? 
o What are the policies or strategies of those controlling particular territories/population 
groups? (Federal government, state governments, Al-Shabaab, others?). 
o Who controls or has power within this system? How? Who is marginalised? 
o How does it link to food aid/cash transfers? 
o What is the role of the displaced/marginalised populations? 
 
2. Why and how have particular population groups consistently been marginalised? Who benefits? 
Who benefits from conflict/famine/continued instability? How? 
 
3. To what extent is food (all aspects, including assessments, contracts for transport, creation of 
NGOs, import licenses, land), used to buy political loyalty or maintain power in other ways? How 
has this changed? 
 
4. How have food assistance regimes of practices changed over time, and what are the power 
effects? (considering in particular 2008, 2011, 2017). 
 
o What have been the key changes in the past 10-15 years in food assistance, and its relation 
with other forms of governance (government, warlords, Al-Shabaab, business)? 
o What are the continuities (why has aid consistently been subject to political and economic 
manipulation)? 
o What are the concepts, policies, techniques, organisations, authorities involved in food 
aid/cash transfers/resilience projects? How have they changed over time? Why? 
(international and local politics). 
o What new actors and infrastructure do cash transfers/resilience projects introduce, and 
what are the effects? 
o What are the interactions between different food/cash/resilience practices and other forms 
of governance (government, Al-Shabaab, NGOs/UN, business)? Consider this for each of the 
practices. For example, 
▪ Humanitarian access – remains a problem in 2017 
▪ Issuing of contracts (business-government-NGO links) 
▪ Manipulation of assessments (ghost villages, camps, bens) 
▪ Transport? How is this organised? (Checkpoints, taxes etc) 
▪ Targeting 
▪ Distribution – taxes, diversion, attack, theft (issue of gatekeepers) 
o What other effects do cash and resilience practices have, in terms of the knowledge they 
produce and the techniques they use (eg, remote management)? 
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Annex 2: Interviews 
 
Key informant 1 (2019). Interview with long-term aid worker. By SJ on 29 March 2019. Skype. 
Key informant 2 (2019). Interview with long-term aid worker. By SJ on 11 April 2019. Skype. 
Key informant 3 (2019). Interview with long-term aid worker (Jarat Chopra). By SJ and NM on 29 
April 2019. Nairobi. 
Key informant 4 (2019). Interview with long-term aid worker. By SJ on 29 April 2019. Nairobi. 
Key informant 5 (2019). Interview with long-term aid worker. By SJ on 29 April 2019. Nairobi. 
Key informant 6 (2019). Interview with long-term aid worker (Joakim Gundel). By SJ on 29 April 
2019. Nairobi. 
Key informant 7 (2019). Interview with long-term aid worker. By SJ and NM on 30 April 2019. 
Nairobi. 
Key informants 10 (2019). Group discussion with long-term aid workers. By SJ and NM on 1 May 
2019. Nairobi. 
Key informant 11 (2019). Interview with long-term aid worker (Luca Alinovi). By SJ and NM on 1 
May 2019. Nairobi. 
Key informant 12 (2019). Interview with money-transfer agent (Hormuud). By SJ and NM on 2 
May 2019. Nairobi. 
Key informant 13 (2019). Interview with long-term aid worker. By SJ and NM on 2 May 2019. 
Nairobi. 
Key informant 14 (2019). Interview with long-term aid worker. By SJ and NM on 2 May 2019. 
Nairobi. 
Key informant 15 (2019). Interview with long-term aid worker. By SJ and NM on 2 May 2019. 
Nairobi. 
Key informant 16 (2019). Interview with long-term aid worker. By SJ and NM on 3 May 2019. 
Nairobi. 
Key informant 17 (2019). Interview with long-term aid worker. By SJ and NM on 3 May 2019. 
Nairobi. 
Key informant 19 (2019). Interview with long-term aid worker. By SJ on 4 May 2019. Nairobi. 
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Key informant 20 (2019). Interview with long-term aid worker. By SJ and NM on 5 May 2019. 
Nairobi. 
Key informant 22 (2019). Interview with former government official. By SJ on 5 May 2019. 
WhatsApp. 
Key informant 23 (2019). Interview with long-term aid worker. By SJ and NM on 9 May 2019. 
Skype. 
Key informant 24 (2019). Interview with long-term aid worker. By SJ and NM on 9 May 2019. 
Skype. 
Key informant 25 (2019). Interview with long-term aid worker. By SJ on 18 June 2019. Nairobi. 
Key informant 26 (2019). Interview with long-term aid worker. By SJ on 19 June 2019. Nairobi. 
Key informant 27 (2019). Interview with long-term aid worker. By SJ on 19 June 2019. Nairobi. 
Key informant 28 (2019). Interview with transporter (Somkan Trading). By SJ on 20 June 2019.  
Key informant 30 (2019). Interview with long-term aid worker. By SJ on 20 June 2019. Nairobi. 
Key informant 31 (2019). Interview with long-term aid worker (Matt Bryden). By on 20 June 2019. 
Nairobi. 
Key informant 32 (2019). Interview with aid worker (VAM briefing). By SJ on 21 June 2019.  
Key informant 33 (2019). Interview with money-transfer agent. Amal. By SJ on 22 June 2019.  
Key informant 34 (2019). Interview with transporter. Jubaland. By SJ on 23 June 2019. Nairobi. 
Key informant 35 (2019). Interview with long-term aid worker. By SJ on 24 June 2019. Nairobi. 
Key informant 36 (2019). Interview with long-term aid worker. By SJ on 24 June 2019. Nairobi. 
Key informant 37 (2019). Interview with long-term aid worker. By SJ on 26 June 2019. 
Mogadishu. 
Key informant 38 (2019). Interview with long-term aid worker. By SJ on 26 June 2019. 
Mogadishu. 
Key informant 39 (2019). Interview with government official (MoA). By SJ on 26 June 2019. 
Mogadishu. 
Key informant 40 (2019). Interview with government advisor. By SJ on 27 June 2019. 
Mogadishu. 
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Key informant 41 (2019). Interview with long-term aid worker. By SJ on 27 June 2019. 
Mogadishu. 
Key informant 42 (2019). Interview with government official. By SJ on 27 June 2019. Mogadishu. 
Key informant 44 (2019). Interview with former government official. By SJ on 8 July 2019. Skype. 
Key informant 45 (2019). Interview with long-term aid worker. By SJ on 10 July 2019. Skype. 
Key informant 46 (2019). Interview with long-term aid worker. By GA on 23 June 2019. Baidoa. 
Key informant 47 (2019). Interview with long-term aid worker. By GA on 25 June 2019. Baidoa. 
Key informant 48 (2019). Interview with long-term aid worker. By GA on 29 June 2019. 
Mogadishu. 
Key informant 49 (2019). Interview with long-term aid worker. By GA on 3 July 2019. Mogadishu. 
Key informant 50 (2019). Interview with wholesaler (WFP retailer). By GA on 24 June 2019. 
Baidoa. 
Key informant 51 (2019). Interview with wholesaler (WFP retailer). By GA on 24 June 2019. 
Baidoa. 
Key informant 52 (2019). Interview with wholesaler and food supplier. By GA on 25 June 2019. 
Baidoa. 
Key informant 53 (2019). Interview with food trader. By GA on 25 June 2019. Baidoa. 
Key informant 54 (2019). Interview with food trader By GA on 30 June 2019. Mogadishu. 
Key informant 56 (2019). Interview with food businesswoman (WFP retailer). By GA on 1 July 
2019. Mogadishu. 
Key informant 59 (2019). Interview with old businessman and politician. By GA on 24 June 2019. 
Baidoa. 
Key informant 60 (2019). Interview with money-transfer agent (Dahabshiil). By GA on 23 June 
2019. Baidoa. 
Key informant 61 (2019). Interview with goverment official (Ministry of Planning). By GA on 23 
June 2019. Baidoa. 
Key informant 62 (2019). Interview with government official (district commissioner). By GA on 
23 June 2019. Baidoa. 
Key informant 63 (2019). Interview with government official (governor). By GA on 26 June 2019. 
Baidoa. 
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Key informant 65 (2019). Interview with IDP representative (gatekeeper?). By GA on 22 June 
2019. Baidoa. 
Key informant 66 (2019). Interview with IDP representative (woman camp leader). By GA on 23 
June 2019. Baidoa. 
Key informant 67 (2019). Interview with IDP head of household (woman). By GA on 29 June 
2019. Mogadishu. 
key informant 68 (2019). Interview with IDP head of household (woman). By GA on 29 June 2019. 
Mogadishu. 
Key informant 69 (2019). Interview with IDP representative (woman). By GA on 29 June 2019. 
Mogadishu. 
Key informant 71 (2019). Interview with IDP head of household (man). By GA on 2 July 2019. 
Mogadishu. 
Key informant 72 (2019). Interview with IDP head of household (man). By GA on 2 July 2019. 
Mogadishu. 
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